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ABSTRACT
SECURE ENTITY AUTHENTICATION
by
Zuochao Dou
According to Wikipedia, authentication is the act of confirming the truth of an
attribute of a single piece of a datum claimed true by an entity.

Specifically,

entity authentication is the process by which an agent in a distributed system
gains confidence in the identity of a communicating partner (Bellare et al.).
Legacy password authentication is still the most popular one, however, it suffers
from many limitations, such as hacking through social engineering techniques,
dictionary attack or database leak.

To address the security concerns in legacy

password-based authentication, many new authentication factors are introduced, such
as PINs (Personal Identification Numbers) delivered through out-of-band channels,
human biometrics and hardware tokens.

However, each of these authentication

factors has its own inherent weaknesses and security limitations.

For example,

phishing is still effective even when using out-of-band-channels to deliver PINs
(Personal Identification Numbers). In this dissertation, three types of secure entity
authentication schemes are developed to alleviate the weaknesses and limitations of
existing authentication mechanisms: (1) End user authentication scheme based on
Network Round-Trip Time (N RT T ) to complement location based authentication
mechanisms; (2) Apache Hadoop authentication mechanism based on Trusted
Platform Module (TPM) technology; and (3) Web server authentication mechanism
for phishing detection with a new detection factor N RT T . In the first work, a new
authentication factor based on N RT T is presented. Two research challenges (i.e.,
the secure measurement of N RT T and the network instabilities) are addressed to
show that N RT T can be used to uniquely and securely identify login locations and
hence can support location-based web authentication mechanisms. The experiments

and analysis show that N RT T has superior usability, deploy-ability, security, and
performance properties compared to the state-of-the-art web authentication factors.
In the second work, departing from the Kerberos-centric approach, an authentication
framework for Hadoop that utilizes Trusted Platform Module (TPM) technology is
proposed. It is proven that pushing the security down to the hardware level in
conjunction with software techniques provides better protection over software only
solutions. The proposed approach provides significant security guarantees against
insider threats, which manipulate the execution environment without the consent of
legitimate clients. Extensive experiments are conducted to validate the performance
and the security properties of the proposed approach. Moreover, the correctness and
the security guarantees are formally proved via Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic.
In the third work, together with a phishing victim identification algorithm, N RT T is
used as a new phishing detection feature to improve the detection accuracy of existing
phishing detection approaches. The state-of-art phishing detection methods fall into
two categories: heuristics and blacklist. The experiments show that the combination
of N RT T with existing heuristics can improve the overall detection accuracy while
maintaining a low false positive rate. In the future, to develop a more robust and
efficient phishing detection scheme, it is paramount for phishing detection approaches
to carefully select the features that strike the right balance between detection accuracy
and robustness in the face of potential manipulations. In addition, leveraging Deep
Learning (DL) algorithms to improve the performance of phishing detection schemes
could be a viable alternative to traditional machine learning algorithms (e.g., SVM,
LR), especially when handling complex and large scale datasets.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Authentication is the process of gaining assurance that an entity is performing
robustly and precisely as intended [132] [33]. The authentication entity could be
an end user, a web server, a service or even a hardware platform. The authentication
credentials for a platform/service could be a certificate (e.g., X.509 certificate [59]), a
ticket (e.g., Kerberos ticket [99]), or a hardware signature (e.g., Physical Unclonable
Functions [113] ) etc. On the other hand, the authentication credentials for a user
fall into three categories: (1) Something you know (e.g., a password) which is the
most common kind of authentication used for humans. (2) Something you have
(e.g., a smart card) that some object must be with the user any time he want to be
authenticated. (3) Something you are (e.g., a fingerprint) which is based on something
intrinsic to the principal being authenticated.
In this dissertation, we present three types of entity authentication works using
existing and novel techniques: (1) End user authentication: a novel and robust
authentication factor based on network communications latency (Chapter 2); (2) Web
server authentication: a novel and robust phishing detection feature (Chapter 3); and
(3) Platform and service authentication: robust insider attacks countermeasure for
Hadoop: design & implementation (Chapter 4); The dissertation is finally summarized
in Chapter 5.

1.1

End User Authentication

The proliferation of cloud-based services (Gmail, Dropbox, Amazon, Facebook, etc.)
and other web services (social sites, E-commerce, etc.), makes end user authentication
a very important security mandate to enable secure interaction with such services.
Each of the traditional web authentication approaches (e.g., legacy password, multi1

factor authentication, etc.) has its inherent weaknesses and suffers from one or more
of the following limitations: (1) potential compromise of credentials through, for
example, internal observation, social engineering, spyware, and leakage from other
verifiers; (2) having single point of failure as in the case of Facebook Connect [93];
(3) vulnerable to active man-in-the-middle attacks through phishing or pharming
[47]; and (4) sometimes having poor user experience due to typing of extra bits of
information or using extra channel or device.
Legacy password authentication is still the most popular one, however it suffers
from many obvious usability and security limitations. For example, users who have
multiple web accounts have either to memorize multiple passwords (poor usability)
or use the same password on multiple accounts (poor security). There have been
many attempts to enhance usability of legacy passwords including LastPass [10],
Facebook Connect [7], and federated passwords such as OpenID [107]. LastPass
remembers user password and fills in the corresponding password fields automatically,
when required. Facebook Connect enables users to sign on into different web services
using their same (e.g., Facebook) authentication credentials. Similarly, OpenID [107]
simplifies web-access by maintaining all the passwords of a user for different website,
and requiring the user to only remember one password, the OpenID password. Then,
while browsing, OpenID provider presents the appropriate password of the user to
other websites, that is, OpenID provider authenticates on behalf of the user. While
such attempts enhance usability, it badly hurts security because attackers gain the
benefit of compromising many web services with single password compromise. To
enhance the security of legacy passwords, graphical passwords [121] and cognitive
passwords [130] have been introduced. However, the proliferation of web services
combined with legacy password vulnerabilities fuels authentication based attacks as
evidenced by RSA study in 2015 [5], which shows that 80% of successful cyber attacks
exploit authentication credentials.
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To overcome the inherited weaknesses of legacy password mechanisms, 2-factor
authentication (2FA) schemes were introduced [108]. 2FA schemes require not only
a password but also an additional piece of information shared only with the user via
out-of-band channels or devices, such as phone SMS and hardware tokens (e.g., RSA
SecurID [13]). However, 2FA schemes introduce new vulnerabilities and suffer from
the following limitations:

1. 2FA does not protect against man-in-the-middle attacks (through, e.g., phishing
[62, 65]).
2. Additional information is exchanged with user through different channels/devices
that are likely to be compromised. For example, smartphone SMS is among
the most widely used 2FA channels but the smartphone itself is vulnerable to
loss and theft (e.g., 4.7 million phones were lost or stolen during 2013 in USA
only [4]). Moreover, smartphones are becoming more and more susceptible to
mobile malware/spyware infections. For example, earlier this year, Symantec
revealed an active Android malware that can intercept SMS messages with 2FA
codes and forwards them to attackers [16]).
3. 2FA may have (i) poor usability, due to typing of extra bits of information and
(ii) poor accessibility, due to the use of extra channel/device.
Biometric-based approaches have also been considered to support secure
authentication by leveraging the uniqueness of physical or behavioral characteristics
of individuals [129]. Nevertheless, there are quite a few limitations that prevent it
from being widely adopted as a web authentication mechanism:

1. Similar to 2FA, biometric authentication schemes have no protection against
active man-in-the-middle attacks for web access.
2. Biometric schemes have even worst user experience due to the extra overhead
required to characterise individuals, e.g. scanning or recording user’s physical
or behavioral characteristics.
3. Often a special device is required for biometric input, which incurs extra cost.
In order to complement the state-of-the-art web authentication schemes by
alleviating many of their inherent weaknesses and vulnerabilities, we propose a
3

new authentication factor based on Network Round Trip Time (N RT T ).

We

show how N RT T can be used to uniquely and securely identify login locations
and hence can support location-based web authentication mechanisms. The first
research challenge is how to securely measure and verify N RT T to hamper potential
forgery attempts. We address the first challenge by introducing a novel forwarding
device in the path between the server and the client, dubbed delay mask (DM),
which prevents any entity, but the server, from being able to measure the N RT T
for any client. The second research challenge is how to reliably measure N RT T
in the face of variable Internet latencies and connectivity conditions. The second
challenge is addressed by (1) computing the average of a number of N RT T
measurements after outlier removal; (2) applying multiple profiles per user through
the deployment of multiple DMs in diverse geographical locations. We design a
two-factor authentication scheme (dubbed AMAN) that uses legacy passwords as
a first factor and N RT T as a second authentication factor. We conduct extensive
experiments to evaluate Security-Usability-Deployability properties of AMAN and
compare it with state-of-the-art authentication mechanisms. The results show that
AMAN achieves the best combination of these properties.

1.2

Web Server Authentication

Phishing has been defined in various ways. According to PhishTank [100]: “Phishing
is a fraudulent attempt, usually made through email, to steal personal information”.
This definition covers most of the cases in which phishing attackers aim at stealing
personal information such as authentication credentials. In a classic email phishing
scenario, an attacker hosts a fake website and presents web service users with
convincing emails containing a link to the fake website. When any web service user
opens the link and enters his sensitive data, the data will be collected by the server
hosting the fake website.
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Khonji et al. [75] defines phishing as a type of computer attack that communicates socially engineered messages to humans via electronic communication channels
in order to persuade them to perform certain actions for the attacker’s benefit. This
definition limits the phishing tactic to only social engineering approaches.
In this dissertation, we adopt the definition provided in [133]: “We define a
phishing page as any web page that, without permission, alleges to act on behalf
of a third party with the intention of confusing viewers into performing an action
with which the viewer would only trust a true agent of the third party”. This
definition neither limits the attacker’s goal (e.g., to steal personal information) nor
limits the attack strategy (e.g., through social engineering messages or sophisticated
techniques).
According to the 2015 phishing activity trends report [51], the total number
of unique phishing sites detected from January through September was 630,494. In
addition, the number of phishing websites increased 250% from the 4th quarter of 2015
through the 1st quarter of 2016 [1]. There is no agreement on the financial damage
caused by the phishing attacks due to the lack of data from victim institutions. Some
estimates show that the direct damage caused by phishing attacks ranges from $61
million per year to $3 billion per year within the U.S. alone [58]
Phishing attacks tend to use more sophisticated techniques to lure web service
users into a carefully designed rogue website.

On one hand, phishing attackers

become more careful and attentive in designing phishing websites and attempt to
evade current phishing detection methods[1].
More importantly, some phishing groups have the ability and desire to perform
advanced phishing attacks. Avalanche (commonly known as the Avalanche Gang) is
a criminal syndicate involved in phishing attacks [135]. In 2010, the Anti-Phishing
Working Group (APWG) reported that Avalanche had been responsible for two-thirds
of all phishing attacks in the second half of 2009, describing it as ”one of the most
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sophisticated and damaging on the Internet” and ”the world’s most prolific phishing
gang” [18]. It has been proved that Avalanche uses different techniques to evade the
anti-phishing mechanisms.
Anti-Phishing techniques can be broadly classified in two different categories:
(1) Server side solutions such as brand monitoring[20]; and (2) Client side solutions
such as blacklists and heuristics techniques[58]. Alternatively, anti-Phishing techniques
can be classified into 3 categories: (1) preventive solutions such as anti-malware, (2)
detective solutions such as email filtering; and (3) corrective solutions such as Site
takedown.
In this work, we focus on the area of phishing detection.

Our goal is to

detect and block Phishing websites immediately after the user clicks its malicious
link. This area is of great importance because if a person behind the keyboard
has been successfully fooled by the Phishing attempt, it doesn’t help how many
firewalls, encryption software, certificates, or two-factor authentication mechanisms
an organization provides [58]. Therefore, we focus here in strengthening the last line
of defence against Phishing by enhancing the chances to detect Phishing attempts
and warning victims before being redirected to the suspicious websites.
The two commonly used ways of client side Phishing detection are heuristics
and blacklists [58]. Heuristics methods examine the contents of web pages including:
(1) surface level contents such as domain name and URL, (2) textual contents such
as words that appear in a given web page, and (3) visual contents such as the layout
and the block regions [91]. These techniques can detect Phishing attacks as soon as
they are launched. However, they introduce relatively high false positive rate. On the
other hand, manually verified blacklist has higher level of accuracy. However, they
do not defend against zero-hour attacks.
In this work, we propose a new phishing detection framework by carefully
combining different phishing detection features together with the phishing target
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identification. Based on the most recent phishing trends, we first perform analysis
of the state-of-the-art phishing detection features collected from the widely used and
popular detection mechanisms. In addition, we introduce a novel phishing detection
factor - Network Round Trip Communications Time (N RT T ) with corresponding
analysis. Then, we present a novel algorithm to identify the target website from
suspicious URL, which is not well addressed by current literature. The evaluation
of the proposed framework show that our proposed mechanism not only has better
performance results but also can neutralize advanced phishing attacks.

1.3

Platform Authentication

Authentication is the process of gaining assurance that an entity is performing
robustly and precisely as intended [132] [33]. In addition, data confidentiality in
the cloud is tightly correlated to the user authentication [140]. Therefore, a secure
and robust authentication mechanism of both users and services is imperative for
secure and private cloud computing and storage operations [86].

However, the

continuous growth and the concentration of data in clouds, combined with the
increasing adoption of security solutions such as authentication, access control,
and encryption drives intruders to be more persistent and creative in developing
sophisticated attack strategies [122]. One way to protect clouds and to successfully
combat such sophisticated attacks is to push the bar higher through the combination
of hardware and software security solutions.

Pushing the security down to the

hardware level in conjunction with software techniques provides better protection
over software-only solutions [104], which is especially feasible and suitable for entity
authentication and platform attestation in the cloud.
Hadoop provides an open source framework for the storage and parallel
processing of large-scale data sets on clusters of commodity computers. As the amount
of data maintained by industrial corporations grows over time, big data processing
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becomes more important to enterprise data centers.Hadoop and its MapReduce
programming model have been proposed to address this task. This model is used
to handle large-scale data sets with high efficiency by taking advantage of parallel
data processing.
However, the threat of data leaks also continues to grow due to the increasing
number of entities involved in running and maintaining cloud infrastructure and
operations [140]. The recent boost of big data start-ups such as MongoDB, DataStax,
MapR Technologies and Skytree leads to an increased number of points of access in
the cloud, that is, larger attack surface for intruders. This can be clearly inferred from
a recent report of the Health Information Trust Alliance (HITRUST), which reveals
that the total cost of health-care data breach incidents has grown to $4.1 billion over
the recent years [56].
Currently, Hadoop leverages Kerberos [114] [21] as the primary authentication
method and uses DIGEST-MD5 security tokens [80] to supplement the primary
Kerberos authentication process. This Kerberos based authentication mechanism
was initially implemented by a team at Yahoo in 2009 [80]. However, in addition
to its limitations and security weaknesses, the use of Kerberos for authentication in
Hadoop-based environments raises many security concerns.
The most vital weakness of Kerberos lies in its dependency on passwords. The
session key for data encryption during the initial communication phase with the Key
Distribution Center (KDC) is derived from the user’s password. Disclosure of KDC
passwords allows attackers to capture users’ credentials, which turns all Hadoop’s
security to be useless. The large number of password disclosure incidents through
cracking, social engineering, or even database leakage, clearly indicates that this
threat is real and pervasive.
It has been shown that in many situations passwords are relatively easy to break
(e.g., via hardware key-loggers, spear Phishing with malware, shoulder surfing, etc.)
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For example, in 2013, almost 150 million people have been affected by a breach into
Adobe’s database [37]. The breach is due to mistakes made by Adobe in handling
clients’ passwords. All passwords in the affected database were encrypted with the
same key. Additionally, the encryption algorithm used did not handle identical plain
texts properly. This resulted in similar passwords being encrypted into similar ciphers.
Another important issue of Kerberos lies in its dependency on the KDC which
constitutes a single point of failure and even a single point of attack for persistent and
dedicated attackers. Although Hadoop’s security design introduces delegation tokens
to overcome this bottleneck, they lead to a more complex authentication mechanism
due to the extra tokens and data flows that are required to enable access to Hadoop
services. Many types of token have been introduced, including delegation tokens,
block tokens, and job tokens for different subsequent authentications. This, relatively,
large number of tokens, not only complicates the configuration and the management
of the tokens, but also expands the attack surface [27]. Kerberos keys are stored
in an on-line third-party database. If anyone other than the proper user has access
to the KDC, through, for example, a malware installation by an insider, the entire
Kerberos authentication infrastructure will be compromised and the attacker will
be able to impersonate any user [54]. This highlights the fact that insiders could
create havoc in Kerberos infrastructure itself, and consequently affect the security
posture of the supported Hadoop. It is clear that Kerberos is not well-equipped
against insiders or outsiders who could change the execution environment that the
user trusts. For example, attackers may install key loggers or other malware-tools to
steal users’ credentials and data.
In this work, we depart from the Kerberos-based approach to propose a
TPM-based authentication protocol for Hadoop. To date, more than 500 million PCs
have been shipped with TPMs, an embedded crypto capability that supports user,
application, and machine authentication with a single solution [104]. Additionally,
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many virtual TPM implementations exist for virtualized environments [32] [110].
An application that can be developed using the software TPM will run using a
hardware TPM without changes [88]. TPM offers facilities for the secure generation
of cryptographic keys, and limitation of their use, in addition to a random number
generator.
Beyond providing the regular authentication services supported by Hadoop, our
protocol provides additional security services that are not provided by the current
state-of-the-art Hadoop authentication protocols.

In addition to alleviating the

aforementioned security weaknesses of Kerberos, our protocol guards against any
tamper with the hardware or software of the target cloud machines that store and
process users’ encrypted data. The user cannot be presumed to trust the execution
environment on public clouds. Malicious insiders/outsiders can pose great threats
to users’ data even if it is encrypted in the steady state. Insiders may be able to
install malicious software (malware, spyware, etc.) and hardware (key loggers, side
channels, etc.) tools that can extract users’ data and sensitive credentials while
it is being processed. The data has to be decrypted before any processing can be
performed.
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CHAPTER 2
A NOVEL AND ROBUST AUTHENTICATION FACTOR BASED ON
NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS LATENCY

2.1

Introduction

Legacy password authentication suffers from many obvious usability and security
limitations. The credentials of the users not only hacked through social engineering
and dictionary attacks, but also databases storing such credentials have been hacked,
exposing massive number of user accounts [64] [74]. To address the security concerns
in legacy password-based authentication, many new authentication factors have been
introduced and tested, including: (1) random strings delivered through out-of-band
channels such as mobiles and emails; (2) human biometrics such as fingerprints and
iris scans; (3) profile-based factors such as profiling normal user behavior, browser
fingerprinting, IP address information, and login location; (4) physical factors such as
cards, hardware tokens, and mobiles; (5) knowledge-based factors such as recognizing
someone based on photos provided by social websites [30]. However, each of these
authentication factors has its own inherent weaknesses and security limitations.
For example, phishing is still effective even when using out-of-band-channels to
deliver second factor Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) or passwords. Internal
observation can also defeat many of these factors, especially human biometrics and
system fingerprinting [139]. Additionally, some of these authentication factors are
static, such as browser fingerprints and IPs, and hence can be forged or leaked
across different verifiers. Physical factors, on the other hand, can be lost, stolen,
or compromised. Furthermore, some factors have high false negative rate such as
keyboard typing rhythms and end user profiling. It is also worth noting that, in
addition to the security limitations, many of these factors have usability issues due
to the requirement of extra information, devices, or channels. Appendix 2.6 provides
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a more detailed and systematic analysis and comparisons of the vulnerabilities of the
state-of-the-art authentication factors.
In this work, we propose a new authentication factor that does not share the
above mentioned properties with the commonly used authentication factors. That
is, the new authentication factor is oblivious to clients and is not communicated
to the server, but rather is completely measured and verified at the server. Our
proposed authentication factor utilizes what initially appears to be counter-intuitive,
the Network Round-Trip communications Time (N RT T ). N RT T is defined as the
summation of the time a packet takes to travel from the server to the client and the
time its acknowledgment takes to travel back from the client to the server.
In this work, we show how to turn the insecure and potentially unstable N RT T
into a robust authentication factor that is resilient to both client compromise and
communication channel compromise. N RT T offers unique security features such
as resiliency to Phishing, MitM, leakage by other verifiers, and social engineering,
which complements the security features of other authentication factors. Moreover,
N RT T has the advantage of being user transparent (i.e., it does not require clients
to memorize or input any information) and has negligible overhead, which enables it
to be smoothly integrated with other authentication factors in multi-factor authentication schemes without introducing extra overhead or degrading usability. However,
N RT T can only be used to provide authentication for low mobility users and static
users, similar to location-based authentication schemes. It is intuitive to see that
arbitrarily mobile users cannot benefit from authentication based on N RT T because
such users require to be able to login from any arbitrary location, while N RT T can
only accept logins from previously profiled locations. Nevertheless, N RT T provides
reliable and secure location-based authentication, which is generally used to ensure
that users can perform sensitive operations (e.g. change password, initiate funds
transfers) or access valuable information (e.g., personal medical information) only
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from authorized locations. Additionally, secure location identification is important
for other security purposes.

For example, geographical location is one of the

most commonly used indicators to detect phishing based on the observation that
phishing websites are most likely to be hosted in locations different from those of the
corresponding legitimate websites [2].
We summarize our contributions in this work as follows:

• Propose a novel secure and usable web authentication factor based on Network
Round Trip Time, N RT T .
• Provide comparative evaluation of N RT T against state-of-the-art authentication factors using a famous authentication benchmark framework.
• Design and implement a novel network architecture that enables secure
measurement of N RT T .
• Design and implement algorithms to alleviate network instabilities and expand
authentication sample space of N RT T .
• Design, implement and deploy a prototype for a use case of two-factor authentication (AMAN) with legacy passwords as the first factor and N RT T as the
second factor. The prototype helps to practically evaluate the security, usability,
and deploy-ability properties of N RT T -based two factor authentication and to
assess its performance overhead.
• Provide mathematical analysis of the N RT T space space via a case study.

2.2

General Methodology to Use N RT T As an Authentication Factor

Authentication using N RT T is straightforward. At registration, N RT T statistics
(i.e., mean and standard deviation) between the client and the authenticator are
measured and stored at the authenticator as a reference profile. The N RT T statistics
are then re-measured with every login attempt in real-time, and login is granted
only if the new statistics fall within predefined boundaries from the corresponding
registration statistics.
It has been observed, through extensive experiments and monitoring of Internet
communications, that N RT T follows distributions that can be modeled as an
13

approximate Gaussian distribution ([80] [120] [125]) as detailed in Section 2.2.1.
We adopt Gaussian approximation to theoretically guide the selection of different
N RT T related parameters in our experiments and theoretical analysis. The mean
and the standard deviation of N RT T measurements vary when the login location
changes, that is, users can be uniquely identified based on their login locations. This
important observation indicates that a login attempt will only succeed if conducted
from the same location as that of registration, which reduces the attack surface
of compromised identities from anywhere in the world to only the registration
location. Note that, location-based authentication is very important in many areas,
such as electronic health record access, sensitive financial transactions, military
communications, industrial control systems, etc. [52, 25] [25] [97] [40]. In addition,
within this work, the login location refers to the last network segment, access point
or 3G/4G cell of the communicating party.

2.2.1

Gaussian Approximation of N RT T

N RT T -based authentication is motivated by the results presented in [80], which show
that network communications latency approximately follows a Gaussian distribution.
This observation is validated by experiments that measure network communications
latency among 130 PlanetLab nodes [37].
We have also conducted extensive and wider set of similar experiments
using GENI nodes, campus and residential users both with wire-line and wireless
connections.

Our results validate the results in [80] and further support the

observations about the Gaussian approximation of network communications latency.
Figure 2.1 shows examples of N RT T distributions and the corresponding Gaussian
approximations for three different locations.
Though fine-grained mathematical model (e.g., Rayleigh distribution) may
provide a better approximation, it will introduce much more complicated theoretical
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Table 2.1 List of All the Acronyms
µ

Mean of the reference profile

σ

Standard deviation of the reference profile

1 − αi

Confidence level

δ

Confidence interval (error tolerance)

x

Mean of the real-time profile

y

Standard deviation of the real-time profile

N

Profiling sample size

analysis with marginal or no additional benefit for the real world implementation
of the proposed algorithms.More importantly, the empirical results of many of the
existing research on round trip network communications latency ([80] [120] [125])
show that Gaussian distribution is an adequate approximation for N RT T . These
conclusions are further supported by our experiments and mathematical analysis
based on the Gaussian approximation of N RT T .

2.2.2

Required Sample Size to Reconstruct the N RT T Profile

N RT T profile is built by exchanging a number of small packets, dubbed profiling
signals, with the user. The number of profiling signals is known as the profiling
sample size. The larger the number of profiling signals, the more accurate the profile
will be. However, the larger the number of profiling signals, the higher the bandwidth
overhead and the longer the login latency. Therefore, it is critical to find a profiling
sample size that leads to an acceptable trade-off between profile accuracy, bandwidth
overhead, and the average time it takes a user to login.
To have an initial estimate of the profiling sample size, we use the Gaussian
approximation of N RT T distribution. Assume a population with Gaussian distribution that has standard deviation σ and mean µ. The goal is to find the minimum
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sample size, N , that produces a mean, x, within a certain error margin (aka, error
tolerance), δ, with a certain confidence level, 1 − α. The error margin δ, is the
maximum allowed distance between µ and x. The confidence level represents how
confident we are that the measured mean (x) falls within the confidence interval. For
Gaussian distributions, it has been shown ([11]) that the minimum sample size N can
be calculated as:
N ≥ (Z1−α /δ)2 σ 2

(2.1)

Where Z is the critical value for the normal distribution. In other words, for a sample
size of N , we are 1-α confident that the measured mean (x) will fall in the range of:
µ−δ ≤x≤µ+δ

(2.2)

Similarly, the range of the real-time measured standard deviation σ can be computed
using Chi-Square (χ) table as:
s

χ2L

S2

·
≤σ≤
N −1

s

χ2R · S 2
N −1

(2.3)

Where χL and χR are computed for specific values of α using the Chi-Square table.

2.2.3

Mathematical Analysis of the N RT T Sample Space

False negative rate (FN): As mentioned in the previous section, the F N rate of
the Gaussian distribution is α, which stands for the probability that a legitimate user
fails to authenticate from her profiled location. Let δi = Ci · Si where Ci is the error
tolerance coefficient for user i and let U be the total number of users. To compute
F N , we plug δi in (2.1):

Z1−αi = Ci ·
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Figure 2.1 Sample of N RT T s and their Gaussian approximations.

FN =

U
X

(1 − Z −1 (Ci ·

p
Ni ))/U

(2.4)

i=1

False Positive Rate (FP): The F P , β, is the probability that a perpetrator
passes authentication from a location other than the profiled one. In other words, false
positive rate is the probability that the real-time measured latency mean and standard
deviation of the perpetrator falls within the grant-access area of the legitimate user.
We first derive a simplified estimate of the false positive rate and then enhance
the derivation accuracy. Figure 2.4 shows the grant-access area for an arbitrary
user (User i) and the grant-access area for a perpetrator (Attacker j) at a random
location. Recall that the perpetrator also possesses the username and password of
the legitimate user. Assume, for now, uniform distribution of the measured mean
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Figure 2.2 The Ecosystem of AMAN.
and standard deviation within the grant-access area (the green rectangle in Figure
2.4 shows the reference profile area of an arbitrary user (User i), dubbed as the
grant-access area (GAA)). Access is granted for any login attempt with measured
(µ, σ) point that falls within the grant-access area.). Also assume that the locations
from which an attacker may try to login are known. Then, the probability that
Attacker j successfully authenticates as User i equals the overlap area between the
grant-access area of the user and the grant-access area of the perpetrator divided by
the grant-access area of perpetrator averaged over all possible attack locations:
βi =


A
X
GAAi ∩ GAAj
j=1

GAAj

A

(2.5)

Where, A is the number of all possible locations from which the attacker may try to
impersonate the user. The overall false positive rate of the system is computed as the
average of false positive rates of all the users of the system:
FP =

U
X
i=1
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βi /U

(2.6)

Figure 2.3 AMAN Authentication Flowchart.
Note that even though this is a simplified estimate of the false positive rate, we next
show that it provides an upper bound approximation of the false positive rate.
To derive a more accurate estimate of the false positive rate, we need to identify
the real distribution of latency mean and standard deviation within the grant-access
area, rather than just assuming it to be uniform. Moreover, we need to remove the
assumption of previously known attack locations by acknowledging that attackers
may use any arbitrary previously unknown location to login. Let the mean of network
communications latency be a random variable X in the range [a, b] and let the standard
deviation of the mean X be a random variable Y in the range [c∗X, d∗X]. According to
the conclusions derived in [4], which is also validated by our experiments, both X and
Y are approximately Gaussian with the following probability distribution functions
(pdf):
(x−µx )
1
−
· e 2·σx2
fX (x) = p
2πσx2
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Figure 2.4 Graphical illustration of arbitrary grant-access area.
(y−µy )
−
1
2
p
fY (y) =
· e 2·σy
2
2πσy

(2.7)

For the systems analyzed in [4], a = 5ms, b = 700ms, c = 0.0155, d = 0.196.
Therefore, the sample space of the communications latency X and its standard
deviation Y falls in the shaded area shown in Figure 2.5. Based on these values,
the pdf parameters of the X and Y distributions are:
µx = 221, σx = 83.86

(2.8)

µy = 0.0155x + (0.196x − 0.0155x)/2 = 0.1058x

(2.9)

σy = (y0.005 − µy )/Q−1 (0.005) = 0.035x

(2.10)
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Figure 2.5 Sample space of the communications latency mean and standard
deviation.
Using Figure 2.4 and assuming error tolerance δ = C · S, the grant-access area can
be computed as:
s
GAA = [(M + δ) − (M − δ)] · [

χ2R · S 2
−
N −1

s

χ2L · S 2
]
N −1

According to the experimental results, the optimal false positive rate occurs when
δ = 0.2 · S. Therefore,
GAA = S 2 /10

(2.11)

Using (2.7), (2.8), (2.9), (2.10), (2.11), the expected value of the grant-access area is
computed as:
Z

b

x=a

−

·e

(x−µx )
2
2·σx

Z

d·x

y=c·x

S2
1
·p
10
2πσx2

(y−µy )
−
1
2
2·σy
·p
·
e
dxdy
2πσy2
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Figure 2.6 Sample of communications latency distribution and its Gaussian
distribution.
−17

= 4.74 × 10

Z

700

Z

0.196x

·
x=5

y=0.0155x

y

y 2 −7.11×10−5 ·x2
·e
x
y2

·e0.0314x+86.367· x −408.16· x2 dxdy

(2.12)

The false positive rate is the probability that an attacker at a random location
successfully impersonates a legitimate user, which is given by:
FP =

E[GAA]
Area of the Sample Space

(2.13)

Using (2.13), for the systems analyzed in [4], the expected value of the false positive
rate is approximately 0.0034. In other words, if the attacker tries to login from 1000
different locations, on average, she successfully authenticates from less than 4 of them.
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This is a very low probability and hence clearly proves the high security guarantees
of AMAN.
Using (2.6), for the systems analyzed in [4], the expected value of the false
positive rate is approximately 0.0068. Therefore, the simplified analysis provided
earlier provides an upper bound estimate of the false positive rate.

False Positive and False Negative Trade-offs: Optimally, we need to keep
both false positive and false negative rates very low. However, these two indicators
are dependent. Decreasing the false negative rate increases the false positive rate
and vice versa. A possible trade-off is to maximize the security guarantees while
maintaining an acceptable functionality level. Using the false positive and false
negative formulas developed in Section 2.2.3, the trade-off can be translated into
the following optimization problem:
PU
Minimize F P =

S.T. F N =

U
X

i=1 βi
=
U

PU PA

[1 − Z −1 · (Ci ·

i=1

j=1

GAAi ∩GAAj
GAAj

A·U
p
Ni )]/U ≤ F Nrequired

i=1

Ci ≥ 0, Ni , U, A ≥ 0, integer

(2.14)

Security administrators can use the optimization problem in (2.14) to guide their
functionality and security configurations.

2.3

Research Challenges to Use N RT T As an Authentication Factor

The naive measurement and usage of N RT T has two main challenges:
Research Challenge I: Attackers can easily estimate N RT T for any location
by simply pinging the server from that location. This represents a serious security
challenge because an attacker can impersonate a user by simulating her communi-
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cations latency. As detailed in Section 2.4.4, this challenge has been addressed by
inserting a special device, delay mask, in the round-trip path between the client and
its authenticator. The goal of the DM is to prevent any entity, but the authenticator,
from being able to estimate N RT T . This marks the two differences between N RT T
and the state-of-the-art authentication factors. The first difference is that the client
does not know the value of its N RT T , which makes it resilient to client compromise.
The second difference is that the value of N RT T is not communicated to the server,
but rather is computed by the server. Deatiled
Research Challenge II Network instabilities may cause communications
latency to vary and consequently result in legitimate login failures, which leads to
poor user experience. Specificall, network communications latency may vary due to
different reasons including congestion, queuing delays, server load, contention ratio in
local network, and ISP throttling or traffic shaping operations. Therefore, the naive
measurement of N RT T may result in poor performance if such network instabilities
are not carefully handled. Our N RT T -based authentication factor is designed with
such instabilities in mind and hence it incorporates the necessary measures to alleviate
the impact of such instabilities. In the following, we classify network instabilities
into three categories, namely, instantaneous instabilities, long-term instabilities, and
routing instabilities, and in Section 2.4, we show how to mitigate the impact of each
category on the measurement of N RT T .
Instantaneous instabilities are instabilities which lead to transient changes
in communications latency and hence, it only affects a few of the profiling signals.
This type of instability is the most common one and can be addressed through outlier
filtering (Algorithm 2) as detailed in Section 2.4.3.
Long-term instabilities are instabilities that stay long enough to affect all or
most of the of profiling signals, however, they are not permanent. Such instabilities
are mainly caused by low bandwidth, congestion, or variable traffic volume at the
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location of the user (i.e., the local network segment connecting the user to the network
backbone). For example, if a user has a low bandwidth Internet, she will experience
longer communications latency while her roommate is watching an HD movie on-line.
We address this category of network instabilities by establishing multiple profiles, as
detailed in Section 2.4.5.
Routing instabilities are instabilities that result in permanent changes in
network communications latency due to, for example, permanent network routing
changes. We introduced a dynamic temporal profiling technique (re-profiling the user
every week based on the most recent login instances) to address long term routing
instabilities. The main motivation of this profiling technique is to capture and handle
changes in N RT T over extended time periods. Changes of the N RT T over long time
periods are mainly due to routing changes in the Internet. We have designed the
temporal profiling algorithm to handle such fairly uncommon cases. The design of
our temporal profiling algorithm (such as the selection to profile every week) is guided
by the long line studies of the routing behavior over the Internet. For example, earlier
studies ([81] [109] [82] [114]) showed that most of the important IP prefixes have stable
routes and that instabilities only exist in a small portion of the global Internet. A
recent study [38], which was based on 3-year daily data and 8-year monthly data,
confirms the results of the earlier studies and further shows that routing changes
have strong weekly periodicity and the rate of change in routing decisions is stable
over time, despite of the overall growth in the size of the Internet. Furthermore, it
also reveals that only a small fraction of ASes are responsible for the vast majority
of routing changes. Additionally, the 2013 experimental data of [80] indicates that
only 2 out of 150 PlanetLab nodes showed 1-hop change while the others remain
unchanged and the latency variance due to the 1-hop change is negligible. Therefore,
routing instabilities are not common and can be addressed, like other unexpected
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events (e.g., forced traffic-reroute, login during DoS attack), using the backup failure
techniques discussed in Section 2.4.6.

2.4

A Use Case of Two-factor Authentication System with N RT T :
Design and Implementation

In this section, we demonstrate the design and the implementation of secure
and reliable N RT T -based authentication factor through a use case of two-factor
authentication scheme, dubbed AMAN. AMAN uses traditional passwords as the
first authentication factor and N RT T as the second authentication factor.
2.4.1

Assumptions

In the context of this work, we assume a powerful attack model, in which attackers
already compromised traditional passwords of users.

However, it is intuitive to

conclude that AMAN, solely by itself, does not defend against perpetrators who
both compromise legitimate user credentials and have access to her profiled location.
Such attacks can be thwarted by augmenting AMAN with additional authentication
factors, such as browser fingerprinting, as explained in Section 2.4.6. Additionally,
Denial of Service (DoS) and remote access attacks (e.g., Rootkits and RATs on end
user devices) are out of the scope of this work. We assume that the registration phase,
when reference profiles are built, is secure, which is a reasonable assumption as it is
required by all profiling schemes. We also assume that delay masks are secure and
connected to network segments that are not accessible by attackers.

2.4.2

The Authentication Protocol

As depicted in Figure 2.2, the ecosystem of AMAN comprises three entities, users,
web server (aka, authenticator or verifier), and delay masks. To demonstrate the
authentication protocol in AMAN, we use the typical web-page login scenario depicted
in Figure 2.3. The authentication protocol has two-phases, registration phase and
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login phase. The registration phase is a one-time process that initializes reference
profiles, while the login phase is initiated with every login attempt to build real-time
profiles. A profile is represented by the mean and the standard deviation of a number
(N ) of N RT T s measured between user and server. Based on the distance between
real-time profiles and reference profiles, the decision algorithm at the authenticator
grants or denies access. To enhance the accuracy of reference profiles, they are
updated with every successful login, that is, the new reference profile after a successful
login is the combination of the current reference profile and the real-time profile of
the last login. The new reference profile replaces the current one in server database
while the real-time profile vanishes after the access decision is made. Using Figure 2.2,
Algorithm 1 presents the detailed steps of the registration phase and login phase,
where each step in the algorithm maps to the corresponding step in Figure 2.3.

2.4.3

Computing Profile Parameters

As shown in steps #4 and #5 of Algorithm 1, the server measures N RT T statistics
of its users by sending out a set of small packets (similar to ping messages), dubbed as
profiling signals. In current prototype implementation, the profiling signals are a set
of UDP/TCP packets with user login session information in the payload (e.g., session
ID, index number, user’s IP address, etc.) An estimate of the number of profiling
signals (N ) that is required to establish a sufficiently accurate profile is discussed in
Section 2.2.2. Before sending profiling signal Si (i ∈ [1, N ]), the server records its
send time (SndT imei ). When the corresponding acknowledgment (acki , i ∈ [1, N ])
is received, the server records the reception time (RcvT imei ). Then, the server
computes the round trip time of each signal as N RT Ti = RcvT imei − SndT imei .
After computing the (N ) N RT T values, the server calls Algorithm 2, which uses
the scheme in [84] to first remove the outliers and then, it computes the mean and
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the standard deviation of the remaining N RT T values. Filtering outliers aims at
alleviating potential instantaneous network instabilities (Section 2.3).

2.4.4

Delay Mask

The naive measurement of N RT T allows attackers to easily figure it out. For example,
the attacker can simply ping the server from the location of the user. Ping packets
provide excellent estimation of the N RT T between the user and the server, and
hence can be used to compute profile parameters. If the attacker learns the profile
parameters of a user and if she is in a location with N RT T less than that of the user,
she can easily mimic the profile of the user; she simply adds appropriate delay before
acknowledging the profiling signals. To address this important security concern,
AMAN introduces a special one-way forwarding device, delay mask, in the route
between the server and its clients. The DM is deployed and controlled by the server
and is set to only relay profiling signals from the server to its users.
The main objective of the DM is to prevent any entity, except the authenticator,
from being able to estimate N RT T . The DM achieves this by creating new pathsegments in the round trip path between the server and its users. Therefore, the
communications time over the newly created path-segments cannot be measured by
outsiders. In Figure 2.2, consider DM1 for instance, the N RT T can be computed as:
N RT T = Ds1 + D1u + 2 · Du + Dus

where (Du + Dus ) is the delay over the path-segments from the user to the server (Ru
and Rus ), and D1u and Ds1 are the delays over the path-segments from DM1 to the
user (R1u ) and from the server to DM1 (Rs1 ), respectively. the attacker may be able
to estimate (Du + Dus ) by pinging the server from the location of the user, however,
it is not possible for her to figure out D1u and Ds1 due to the stealthy nature of
DM and its one-way communication architecture. In other words, round trip cycles
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Algorithm 1 AMAN Authentication Process
Input: Total number of DMs (D), number of profiles per user (r ≤ D), number
of selected profiles per user (m ≤ r), number of profiling signals per profile (N )
Output: Grant or deny access
1: Registration Request: User sends request to server
2: Profiling Request: Server seeks the permission of the user
3: Ready to Profile:

• User accepts profiling request
• Server randomly picks r out of the D available DMs. Each of the selected
(r) DMs will be used to generate a different profile for user
4: Sending profiling signals: Server,

• Sends r · N profiling signals interleaved among the r DMs.

Let ds =

{d1 , d2 , ..., dr } be the set of selected DMs and let ps = {S1 , S2 , ..., Sr·N } be
the set of profiling signals. Signal Si in ps is forwarded through DM j in ds ,
where j = i mod r + 1.
• Records SndT imei of each Si (i ∈ [1, r · N ])
5: Acknowledgments: For i ∈ [1, r · N ],

• User sends acki of Si directly to server
• Server records RcvT imei of acki
• Server computes N RT Ti = RcvT imei − SndT imei
Compute profile parameters: For j ∈ [1, r], if all the (N ) N RT T values of dj are
ready,
• Server calls Algorithm 2 to compute mean and standard deviation for each
of the r profiles
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6: Registration done: Server,

• Chooses the m most stable profiles out of the computed r ones (i.e. the
m profiles that has the smallest standard deviation values) as the set
of reference profiles for the user. This step helps in alleviating routing
instabilities.
• Server acknowledges user and returns
7: Login Request: User sends login request to server
8: Profiling Signals: Server repeats step #4 using m instead of r
9: Acknowledgments: Repeat step #5 using m instead of r
10: Response to User : Server sends the result of calling Algorithm 4

can neither be established on the path-segment between the user and the DM nor on
the path-segment between the DM and the server. Additionally, hiding the location
of the DM (by hiding its IP) prevents estimates of the delays to the DM through
measurement of the delay to close by entities. Therefore, the server is the only entity
of AMAN that can measure profile parameters. We note here that legitimate users
do not learn anything about their profiles or the profiles of other users. This not only
makes N RT T transparent to the users as they do not need to memorize or remember
anything, but also prevents compromised users from breaching the security of AMAN.
Finally, we note that even in the worst case scenario in which N RT T is
disclosed, the attacker can impersonate the user (assuming her password is already
compromised) only from locations that have similar or lower N RT T values compared
to that of the legitimate location, which reduces attack service and makes it harder.
Additionally, as we see in the next section, the deployment of multiple DMs adds
to the complexity and sophistication of such attacks and makes it highly unlikely
because the attack can only succeed from locations that have lower N RT T values for
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all the used DMs; which can be made difficult to achieve by careful deployments of
the DMs.

2.4.5

Multiple Profiles

Delay mask represents a novel idea in the design of AMAN because it makes N RT T
measurement robust and extremely hard to manipulate. However, AMAN with single
DM suffers from two main limitations in the case of password compromise. The
first is its vulnerability to un-throttled guessing due to the low entropy (E) in N RT T
(E ≈ 10 bits [71], the detailed mathematical analysis of N RT T entropy is omitted for
the sake of space). The second is the impact of network instabilities on the usability
of AMAN due to the potential increase in the number of legitimate login failures. To
address these limitations, AMAN deploys multiple DMs in different network locations.
Multiple DMs are used to create multiple different profiles per user. Algorithm 1
shows how AMAN generates multiple profiles using multiple DMs.
In the following, we demonstrate how multiple profiles can deter un-throttled
guessing and alleviate network instabilities, then we present the authentication
decision algorithm.

Defense Against Un-throttled Guessing: In general, un-throttled guessing is
a brute force attack in which the attacker is allowed to try all possible credential
combinations until she hits the right one. However, it is extremely hard for the
attacker to try all possible combinations in AMAN due to physical limitations.
Attacker can only simulate latencies that are higher than her own by appropriately
delaying acknowledgments of profiling signals, that is, there is no possible way for an
attacker to impersonate a user whose N RT T is lower than her own.
Even when passwords are compromised, multiple profiles help in defending
against un-throttled guessing by both expanding authentication sample space (i.e., the
collection of all possible credential combinations) and by making guessing extremely
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hard (if not impossible) to perform. It is fairly easy to show that multiple profiles
considerably expand single-profile sample space. Assume that the entropy of the
single-profile sample space is E, then the entropy of the m-profile sample space is
simply m · E, because the profiles are independent.
More importantly, multiple profiling further reduces the set of possible users
that the attacker can possibly impersonate. For an attacker to impersonate a user,
her N RT Ti through DMi (i ∈ [1, m]) has to be faster than the corresponding N RT Ti
(i.e., through the same DM) of the user. If any of the N RT Ti values of the user
is faster than the corresponding one of the attacker, the attack definitely fails. The
larger the number of DMs (m), the harder the attack can be performed. In fact, by
carefully positioning the DMs, the attack can be made extremely hard to succeed.
Algorithm 2 Compute Profile Parameters
Input: Set R ={N RT Ti , i ∈ [1, 2, ..., N ]};
Output: mean and standard deviation
1: procedure Filter outliers
2:

Computes the median value of R: M = M edian(R)

3:

Computes median absolute deviation (MAD) of R:
M AD = b ∗ M edian(abs(N RT Ti − M ));
Where b = 1.5 for normal distribution

4:

Remove N RT Ti > M + τ × M AD from R;
Where τ = 2 (moderately conservative)

5: end procedure
6: Return mean and standard deviation of R

Alleviating Long-term Instabilities: Network latency comprises delay in local
network and backbone delay. The work in [44] shows that traffic congestion is the
main cause of local network delay, and it only marginally affects backbone delay. It
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also shows that the main contributing factor of the backbone delay is the speed of
light where the delay jitter is extremely low [44]. These results lead to the conclusion
that backbone network is much more stable than local network. The empirical results
in [80] and our experiments also support this conclusion, that is, the main contributor
of long-term network instabilities is traffic congestion in local networks. We design
here a novel algorithm based on multiple profiling to mitigate the impact of such
instabilities on N RT T measurements.
To see that, consider the DMs depicted in Figure 2.2, which are used to establish
different user profiles. All the profiles share the same local network segment (Ru ) but
have different and more stable backbone routes (Rs1 + R1u , · · ·, Rsm + Rmu ) [44].
Therefore, congestion in the local network (Ru ) will introduce similar noise in all the
real-time profiles. To filter out such noise, AMAN uses Algorithm 3. AMAN first
measures the difference between real-time mean (x) and reference mean (µ) of each
profile as 4Ti = xi − µi , where i ∈ [1, m]. Then, AMAN verifies that (i) either all
the 4Ti values are greater than δ or all the 4Ti values are less than −δ, where δ is
the error tolerance defined by Equation (1) in Section 2.2.2, and (ii) the variance of
the 4Ti values is less than η = 0.5, where η is an experimentally predefined value.
If these two conditions are true, then it is highly likely that the noise is caused
by local congestion. In this case, AMAN simply subtracts the average noise value
(4T = mean{4Ti }) from the mean of each real-time profile before applying the
authentication decision algorithm (Section 2.4.5).

The Access Decision Algorithm: The access decision algorithm (Algorithm
4) presents the logic by which AMAN grants or denies access to end users based on
the real-time profiles and the stored reference profiles. As explained in Section 2.4.2,
the server keeps the m most stable profiles as the reference profiles for each user.
With each login attempt, the server builds m corresponding real-time profiles. After
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Algorithm 3 Filter out Long-term Instability
Input: real time means xj ; reference means µj , δ, η
Output: shared increment 4T
1: procedure Calculate-Increments
2:

Initialization: 4T0 = 0

3:

for j ∈ [1, 2, ..., m] do

4:

4Tj = xj − µj

5:

if 4Tj · 4Tj−1 < 0 (opposite trend) then
return 4T = 0 ;

6:
7:

end if

8:

if −p < 4Tj < p
(within the error tolerance of the Gaussian distribution) then
return 4T = 0 ;

9:
10:

end if

11:

end for

12:

std = standard deviation{4Tj }

13:

if std > η
(increments vary a lot) then

14:

return 4T = 0;

15:

end if

16:

4T = mean{4Tj }

17:

return 4T

18: end procedure
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computing the mean (µi ) and the standard deviation (σi ) of each of the m real time
profiles (Section 2.4.3), AMAN uses the Gaussian PDF algorithm [123] to compute
the distance (scoreP DF ) between the reference profiles and the the real-time profiles:
i=m

scoreP DF =

2
1 X − (xi −µ)
e 2·σ2
m i=1

Access is granted if scoreP DF ≥ T hresholdP DF , otherwise access is denied. The
threshold is experimentally selected to match the desirable trade-off between false
positives and false negatives as detailed in Section 2.5.
To further refine and tighten the access decision, AMAN can use out-of-band
channels such as SMS or email to request supporting evidence in doubtful or
borderline situations. In this case, the decision will be either clear accept, clear
deny, or supporting evidence is required. The supporting evidence could be a random
number delivered to the user through an out-of-band channel. This enhancement
serves multiple purposes: (i) it can alleviate legitimate login failures that may occur
due to unexpected events on the Internet such as network traffic re-route, (ii) it can
support arbitrarily mobile clients, (iii) it can be used as a backup channel to recover
from long-term login failures such as exceeding the maximum number of login retries,
and (iv) it can be used to establish new spacial profiles for the user in new login
locations.

2.4.6

Other Important Discussions

The cyber security threat landscape is complex and continuously evolving, and hence,
no security mechanism is foolproof. In this section, we discuss the limitations of the
proposed scheme and provide corresponding solutions, including: (1) the potential
integration of AMAN with other authentication factors to support arbitrarily mobile
clients; (2) defense against sophisticated attacks, in which attackers both compromise
legitimate credentials and have access to the legitimate login locations; and (3) defense
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Algorithm 4 Authentication Decision Algorithm
Input: real time parameters (xj , yj )
reference parameters (µj , σj )
Output: authentication decision: True or False
1: procedure Compare-Profiles
2:

4T = call Algorithm 3

3:

scoreP DF = 0

4:

for j ∈ [1, 2, ..., m] do

5:

xj = xj − 4T
−

6:

scoreP DF + = e

(xj −µ)2
2·σ 2
j

7:

end for

8:

scoreP DF = scoreP DF /m

9:

if scoreP DF ≥ threshold then

10:
11:
12:
13:

return True ← Grant access
else
return False ← Deny access
end if

14: end procedure
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against low rate DDoS attack; and (4) considerations of the deployment for the delay
masks.

Mobility and Login Failures: Mobile clients can be broadly classified into: (i)
Low mobile clients who frequently login from a number of locations such as home,
office, and library. In this case, AMAN simply creates a separate profile for each
location. A user will be granted access if her real-time login profile matches any of the
stored profiles. (ii) Arbitrarily mobile clients who may login from any arbitrary
location. In applications that support such mobile clients (also in case of login
failure), AMAN could use other authentication factors such as browser fingerprinting
or random strings delivered through out-of-band-channels such as SMS and emails
and then apply the enhanced decision algorithm as detailed in Section 2.4.5. However,
we note here that if other factors are used to enable arbitrary mobility, mobile users
do not benefit from the added security features provided by N RT T such as resiliency
to Phishing and MitM.

Sophisticated Attackers: As clarification, a sophisticated attacker, in our attack
model, is that an attacker who compromised the password, knows the login location
of the user, and has physical access to the login location of the user. We acknowledge
that such attacker may succeed in impersonating the user, however, we would
like to highlight the following facts: (1) We do not and can not claim that our
authentication mechanism can be used anonymously for any generic application,
but rather we have clearly stated that our N RT T based authentication mechanism
could greatly enhance the security of authentication in certain applications such
as location-based authentication applications.

Similar to most of the security

mechanisms, we acknowledge that persistent and targeted attacks (attackers attempt
to detect and exploit individual details of users) are very challenging and hard to block
[83]. However, we note that, most of the authentication-based cyber attacks (e.g.,
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stealing username/password by compromising the database of the web server) do not
incorporate the users’ location information and simply try to use these credentials
as soon as possible from arbitrary locations, before being revoked. Therefore, we
are confident that even though our authentication mechanisms is not completely
fool-proof, it decreases the probability of attack success by greatly reducing the attack
surface from anywhere in the world to only the login location of the user. (2) The
“login location” as defined in our work does not mean the geographical nearby places
but the same login network. For example, N RT T will vary substantially if the user
logs in through different networks (e.g., 4G, WiFi, etc.), even in the same room. (3)
As mentioned in this work, the login location issue can be addressed by augmenting
our authentication mechanism with additional factors such as browser fingerprints
and on-demand dynamic passwords.

Low Rate DDoS Attacks: DDoS attacks are out of the scope of this work.
However, instead of completely taking down the service, low rate DDoS attacks
increase the network traffic (i.e., increase the N RT T ) and hence, it may hinder
the intended functions of our authentication mechanism. This type of attacks may
occur in different scenarios and hence can be alleviated according to each specific
scenario: (1) Low rate DDoS attack in the server or the local network of the user
is implicitly addressed and is already alleviated by the proposed shared increment
removal algorithm utilizing the deployment of multiple DMs. This is simply because
Low rate DDoS attacks in this scenario cause similar delays for all the real time
profiles and hence can be easily filtered out; (2) Low rate DDoS attack against one
of the DMs is alleviated by the design of multiple profiles and the use of the adaptive
decision algorithm. For example, for a design with 3 DMs, even if one of the DM paths
is under low rate DDoS attack, the overall output of the decision algorithm wouldn’t
be affected much because it is an averaging of all the three profiles. In addition, the
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adaptive decision algorithm will warn the server if one of the profiles goes beyond a
certain threshold while the others remain at normal level; (3) The probability of low
rate DDoS attack in multiple DM paths with different rates is very low, however, it
still can be addressed by randomising the DMs per session per user.

Considerations for the Deployment of the DMs: Recall that the DM is
assumed to be connected to a separate dedicated secure network segment such that
attackers (and also legitimate users) do not know its IP and can neither connect from
the location of the DM nor can they compromise it. One way of hiding the IP of
the DM is by spoofing the IP address of the server. Before forwarding the profiling
signal, the DM sets the source IP field of the packet to the IP address of the server
instead of its own IP. In addition to hiding the existence of the DM, this also makes
AMAN transparent to end users. However, controlled spoofing of the IP address of
the server by the DM is very challenging because it requires collaboration with the
ISP hosting the DM to avoid dropping of the spoofed packets.
In addition, Software Defined Network (SDN) provides the possibility of a
lightweight solution due to its centralized control plane design. The ISP controller
could easily modify the forwarding policy globally and route the packets arbitrarily.
Furthermore, the deployment cost of multiple DMs could be reduced by utilizing
existing infrastructure of the web service. For example, Google has many offices,
repair branches, and data centers where DMs could be deployed.

2.5

Evaluation of N RT T As an Authentication Factor Using AMAN

We conduct a thorough set of experiments to evaluate the usability (in terms of false
negative rate, F N ) and the security (in terms of false positive rate, F P ) trade-offs
of AMAN. We also study the impact of network instabilities on AMAN and assess
its performance overhead. Specifically, we measure the following five metrics: (i) the
false negative rate (F N ), which is the probability that a legitimate login attempt
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fails, (ii) the false positive rate (F P ), which is the probability that a perpetrator
who possesses the password of a legitimate user successfully authenticates on her
behalf, (iii) the login latency overhead (LLO), which is the average extra time it
takes a user to successfully authenticate in AMAN compared to legacy one-factor
password authentication, (iv) the storage overhead (SO), which is the extra storage
space required per user in AMAN, and (v) the bandwidth overhead (BO), which is
the extra network bandwidth incurred per login instance in AMAN. For all these
metrics the lower the value is the better.
We measure the variations in these metrics by varying four parameters: (i) the
number of profiles per user (m), (ii) the decision threshold (DT ), (iii) the number
of profiling signals (N ), and (iv) the maximum number of login retries (LR). In all
the following experiments, unless otherwise stated, we use N = 45, LR = 2, m = 2,
DT = 0.85 : 0.005 : 0.92, and Gaussian PDF in the access decision algorithm. We
re-emphasize that the F P values presented here are for powerful attackers, that is,
attackers who already know passwords of legitimate users they try to impersonate.

2.5.1

Experimental Setup

We build a test-bed that implements the three entities of AMAN with the following
configurations:

• Users: The user population consists of 10 Amazon EC2 instances, 130
PlanetLab nodes, 25 GENI nodes, and 63 residential WiFi users randomly
selected from different places in USA and Canada.
• Authenticators: The authenticator runs Apache HTTP Server version 2.4
and a web service implemented in HTML and PHP. The authentication
credentials (username, password, profile mean, profile standard deviation,
decision threshold, etc.) are stored in a M ySQL database.
• Delay Mask: We configure 3 PCs to work as the DMs. A C program
is implemented on top of the MAC layer to relay the profiling signals from
authenticators to users. The DMs are deployed in Oregon (USA), Germany,
and Qatar.
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Figure 2.7 ROC curves of F P -F N ; Varying the # of profiling signals N ; P = 2,
LR = 2, DT = 0.85 : 0.005 : 0.95.

2.5.2

Experimental Results

We first present the usability and security trade-offs, then we present the impact of
traffic conditions on the access decision algorithm, and finally, we analyze the storage
and performance overhead of AMAN.

Usability and Security Trade-offs: In this section, we study the trade-offs
between usability (F N ) and security (F P ) properties of AMAN under different
system parameters.
To measure F N , for each test instance (e.g., a test with P = 2, N = 45,
DT = 0.92, LR = 2), each of the 25 GENI nodes and 63 residential WiFi users
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Figure 2.8 ROC curves of F P -F N ; Varying the maximum # of login retries LR;
N = 45, P = 2, DT = 0.85 : 0.005 : 0.95.
attempted to login 300 times. The data were collected within one day period for
GENI nodes (i.e., wireline connections). For residential users (i.e., WiFi connections),
the data were collected at random time within one month period). To measure F P ,
each of the 25 GENI nodes tries to login 300 times within one day period using
the username and password of the other 217 clients (i.e., the other 24 GENI nodes,
63 residential users, and 130 PlanetLab nodes), a total of 1,627,500 (25*217*300)
impersonation attempts are launched for each test instance. In all the following
experiments, we vary the DT from 0.85 to 0.92 with 0.005 step and measure F P and
F N values for each threshold point.
Note that, the experiments are indeed conducted over long time periods, not
within a few days. The experimental data for the 63 residential users was collected and
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Figure 2.9 ROC curves of F P -F N ; Varying the # of profiles per user P ; N = 45,
LR = 2, DT = 0.85 : 0.005 : 0.95.
tested over one month period. In addition, our testbed has been running for about one
year. Even though the tests are not performed continuously, they still demonstrate
good performance for each individual test, thanks to the proposed dynamic temporal
profiling algorithm described in Section 2.3.
Varying the number of profiling signals (N ): Figure 2.7 shows the ROC
(receiver operator characteristics) curves of F N and F P with variable DT for N
equals 27, 45 and 91. The figure emphasizes the analysis results in Section 2.2.2 as
it clearly shows that both F P and F N improve (lower values) as N increases. For
example, AMAN can achieve F P = 0 and F N ≈ 0.85% for N = 45. The figure also
shows that with N = 91, AMAN achieves F P = 0 and F N = 0.
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Figure 2.10 Raw data of N RT T s for two different profiles taken every 20 minutes
for 60 hours.
Varying the maximum number of login retries (LR): Figure 2.8 shows
the ROC curves of F N and F P with variable DT for LR values of 1, 2, and 3. The
figure clearly shows that LR has big positive impact on F N . When the user has a
second chance to login after the first failed one, F N can be significantly reduced. On
the other hand, LR has a relatively very small negative impact on F P . Increasing
LR, only slightly increases F P because attacker almost gains nothing when given
another login chance, even if the new login chance is performed from a new location,
thanks to the large authentication sample space of AMAN. The figure shows that for
LR = 3, AMAN can achieve both F N = 0 and F P = 0.
Varying the number of profiles per user (m): Figure 2.9 shows the ROC
curve of the F N and F P with variable DT for m values of 1, 2 and 3. The figure
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Figure 2.11 The F N curve with variable DT for three different decision algorithms.
clearly shows that the number of profiles per user has significant positive impact on
F P . The 1-profile F P value is much larger than that of the 2-profile and the 3-profile
cases. This is intuitive because multiple profiles both increase the authentication
sample space, and considerably decrease impersonation by physically limiting the
number of locations from which impersonation could be lunched (Section 2.4.5).
Similarly, the larger the number of profiles, the lower the F N . Recall that multiple
profiles help to filter out network instabilities and hence decreases F N . The figure
shows that with m = 3, AMAN can achieve F P = 0 and F N = 0.

Impact of Network Instabilities: For this experiment, we set a WiFi user
connected to the university campus to login every 20 minutes for 60 hours, from
9AM Friday through 9PM Sunday. Figure 2.10 shows all the N RT T values measured
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Figure 2.12 The CDF of login latency overhead with variable W L.
for two different profiles during the test period, a total of 8100 (60*3*45) N RT T s
per profile. The figure clearly shows the variations in N RT T values over different
time periods. To evaluate the impact of such variations on the F N rate and to
assess the capabilities of AMAN to cope with them, we use the data in Figure 2.10
to compute the F N rate over all the login attempts. Recall that AMAN uses outlier
filtering (Algorithm 2) and shared increment removal (Algorithm 3) to alleviate
instantaneous and long-term instabilities, respectively. Figure 2.11 shows F N as a
function of DT for baseline AMAN (no filtering), AMAN with outlier filtering alone
(AMAN-OF), and AMAN with both outlier filtering and shared increment removal
(AMAN-OFIR) with p = 0.5ms and q = 0.5ms. The figure shows that network
instabilities can badly hurt the usability of AMAN as evidenced by the 10% F N rate,
which is the best F N rate that baseline AMAN can achieve. On the other hand,
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the figure shows the effectiveness of AMAN in coping with network instabilities as
evidenced by the 0 F N rate achieved by AMAN-OFIR, almost irrespective of the
DT value used. The flexibility in DT is very important as it allows AMAN-OFIR to
achieve lower F P rate as well, because the higher the DT , the better the F P .

2.5.3

Performance Overhead

Login Latency Overhead (LLO): In this experiment, we evaluate the login
latency overhead (LLO) per user in AMAN compared to that in legacy password
authentication. We use the 10 Amazon instances in our test-bed to generate variable
server workload (W L), which is measured by the number of login requests per second.
Then, we measure the LLO of 12,420 logins under server workloads of 100, 200 and
300 login requests per second. Figure 2.12 shows the empirical cumulative distribution
functions (CDFs) of LLO under each W L. The figure shows that more than 99%
of the login instances have LLO less than 0.185 seconds, which is unnoticeable to
humans.

Bandwidth Overhead: The bandwidth overhead (BO) is caused by the profiling
signals and the acknowledgments of every login attempt. Each of the m profiles
requires N profiling signals and N acknowledgments per login attempt. The size
of the profiling signal/acknowledgment is about 50 bytes including all the headers.
Therefore, BO = 100 · m · N bytes/login instance. Based on our experiments, m =
3, N = 45 provides excellent trade-off between F P and F N , and hence, BO =
100 · 3 · 45 = 13500 ≈ 13K bytes. This is a negligible overhead given the fact
that login bandwidth consumed by most of the popular websites (e.g., Chase.com,
Facebook.com, Amazon.com) ranges between 10.98K and 125.47K bytes, according
to a study that we have conducted on 12 popular web services.
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2.6

Evaluation of N RT T and Other State-of-the-art Second
Authentication Factors

In this section, we perform thorough comparative evaluation of N RT T -based
authentication factor against state-of-the-art authentication factors by employing a
famous benchmarking framework for web authentication, which has been proposed
by Joseph Bonneau et al. [29]. We compare N RT T (represented by H in Table
2.2) against: A1: Second Authentication Code (SAC) through email [46], A2: SAC
through mobile SMS/voice [53], B1: disconnected hardware token (e.g., RSA SecurID
[14]), B2: connected hardware token (e.g., smartcard-like USB token, NFC, etc. [50]
[39]), C: paper token (e.g., PIN+TAN [134]), D: biometrics (e.g., fingerprint, iris,
voice recognition, etc. [112]), keystroke [95], E1: non-keystroke device characteristics
(e.g., mouse click pattern, [105]), E2: hardware/system signature (e.g., browser
fingerprint, trusted platform module, etc.

[96] [70] [43]), F: knowledge-based

information (e.g., photo recognition of somebody you know [30]).
The benchmark encompasses twenty five properties grouped into three categories,
namely, usability, deploy-ability and security. Each property has two-dimensional
score (V U ). The first entry of the score (V ) indicates whether the authentication
scheme offers the property (V = Y ), does not offer the property (V = N ), or partially
offer the property (V = A). The second entry of the score (U ) indicates whether this
property offering is better than (U = ” + ”), similar to (U = ” ”, i.e., no symbol),
or worse than (U = ” − ”) that of the legacy password scheme (the baseline). For
example, if an authentication scheme offers a certain property better than the baseline,
the score of this authentication scheme against that property will be Y +. Table 2.2
presents the comparison among factors. The results clearly show that N RT T has the
best combination of usability, deploy-ability and security proprieties. In the following,
we explain the benchmark properties that may not be straightforward and drop the
explanation of the intuitive ones.
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Deployability

Usability

Security

Table 2.2 Evaluation of N RT T and Other State-of-the-art Second Authentication
Factors
A1

A2

B1

B2

C

D

E1

E2

F

G

H

Resilient-to-Physical-Observation

A+

A+

A+

Y+

N-

Y+

N-

N-

Y+ Y+

Y+

Resilient-to-Targeted-Impersonation

A+ A+ Y+

Y+ Y+

N-

Y

Y

A+

N-

A+

Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y+

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y+

Y

Y

Y

A-

Y

Resilient-to-Internal-Observation

N

N

Y+

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

Y

Y+

Y+ Y+

N-

N-

N-

N-

Y

Y+

Resilient-to-Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers Y+ Y+ Y+
Resilient-to-Phishing

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

Y+

Resilient-to-Theft

Y

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

No-Trusted-Third-Party

N-

N-

N-

N-

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N-

Requiring-Explicit-Consent

Y

Y

Y

A-

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Unlinkable

N-

N-

Y

Y

Y

N-

N-

N-

N-

A+

Y+

Memorywise-Effortless

A+ A+ A+

Y+ Y+ Y+ Y+ Y+ Y+

N

Y+

Scalable-for-Users

Y+

Y+

N-

N-

Y+

Y+

Y+ Y+ Y+

N-

Y+

Nothing-to-Carry

Y

N-

N-

N-

N-

Y+ Y+ Y+ Y+

Y+

Y

Physically-Effortless

N

N

N

A+

N

N-

Y+ Y+

N-

Y+

Easy-to-Learn

Y

Y

A-

Y

A-

Y

Y+ Y+ Y+

Y

Y

Efficient-to-Use

N-

N-

A-

A-

A-

N

Y

Y

Y+

N-

Y+

Infrequent-Errors

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

A-

A-

N-

Y

A-

A-

Easy-Recovery-from-Loss

Y

Y

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

Y

Y

Accessible

Y

A

A

A

A

N-

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y+

Negligible-Cost-per User

Y

N-

N-

N-

Y-

N-

Y

Y

A-

Y

Y

Server-Compatible

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

N-

Browser-Compatible

Y

Y

Y

N-

Y

N-

Y

N-

N-

Y

A-

Mature

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N-

N-

N-

N-

A-

N-

Non-Proprietary

Y

Y

N-

A-

Y

A-

A-

Y

N-

Y

Y

N

”-” = Worse than Legacy Password; no symbol = Same as Legacy Password; ”+” = Better than Legacy Password;
Y = offer the property; N = does not offer the property; A = partially offer the property.
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2.6.1

Security

Resilient-to-Physical-Observation: It evaluates the potential leakage of authentication credentials by physical observation of users during login. For N RT T -based
authentication, even legitimate users can not learn or compute their own profile
parameters (Section 2.4.4). Therefore, it is completely resilient to physical observation.

On the other hand, SAC and legacy password schemes are susceptible

to physical observation. Biometric factors based schemes are partially resilient to
physical observation due to the potential capture of individual biometrics using special
tactics, such as lifting fingerprints from the glass surface of scanners.

Resilient-to-Targeted-Impersonation: It evaluates the potential of targeted
impersonation by capturing or simulating specific user authentication factors. N RT T based authentication which has been shown to be robust and unforgeable factor
(Section 2.4.4), and hence, N RT T is completely resilient to targeted impersonation.
Other factors, take biometric factor - fingerprint for example, it is obviously
susceptible due to fixed fingerprint values.

Resilient-to-Internal-Observation: It evaluates whether the attacker can capture
credentials by intercepting the input of the user inside her device.

As detailed

in Section 2.4.2, N RT T -based authentication does not require any user input.
Therefore, it is highly unlikely, even for the legitimate users, to learn or compute
their own N RT T . On the other hand, SAC is susceptible to internal observation
since attackers might be able to intercept authentication codes in SMS/email.

Resilient-to-Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers: It evaluates whether specific user’s
credentials could be leaked across different verifiers. For N RT T , thanks to the DMs,
profile parameters across different verifiers are independent, and hence, user profiles
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in one verifier are decoupled from her profiles in other verifiers. However, biometrics
factors (e.g., fingerprint) are completely susceptible.

Resilient-to-Phishing: It evaluates whether man-in-the-middle (MitM) attackers
can capture credentials. Active-Phishing describes the attack in which perpetrators
use forged websites to capture authentication credentials (legacy password, SAC,
fingerprints, etc.) and then, use them in real time to impersonate legitimate users.
The concept of MitM does not apply in the case of N RT T because its users do
not send credentials that could be intercepted by attackers, instead credentials are
measured at the server. Similar to legacy passwords, both SAC and biometric factors
are obviously susceptible to MitM attackers.

Resilient-to-Theft: It evaluates the potential leakage of credentials through loss
or theft of special authentication devices, such as authentication tokens. This is
not applicable to N RT T as it does not require any devices. On the other hand,
SAC through mobile SMS and all token-based factors are susceptible to theft-related
attacks.

Unlinkable: It evaluates whether colluding verifiers can determine user credentials
on other verifiers. As explained in leaks-from-other-verifiers, N RT T profiles across
different verifiers are uncorrelated. However, biometric factors (e.g., fingerprints) are
obviously linkable due to unique user biometrics.

2.6.2

Usability

Scalable-for-Users: It evaluates the burden on users who may have multiple
accounts on different web services. For example, in legacy password systems, a user
has to create a different password for each service. N RT T can be scaled to any
number of accounts per user without creating any extra burden. N RT T profiles for
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the same user on different verifiers are independent and are measured and stored by
the server.

Physically-Effortless: It evaluates whether the authentication factor requires
physical (as opposed to cognitive) user effort beyond, say, pressing a button.
N RT T -based authentication does not require any such effort. On the other hand,
SAC users need to transcribe passwords from their phones/email into browsers and
fingerprint users need to scan their fingerprints.

Efficient-to-Use: It evaluates the time it takes the user to successfully login.
We show that extra login latency overhead of N RT T -based authentication scheme
(compared to the baseline of legacy passwords) is less than 185ms, which is negligible
and is completely unnoticeable by end users. On the other hand, SAC users have to
wait for SMS message to get authentication code, which may take a few seconds, and
biometric factor scanning may take several seconds.

Easy-Recovery-from-Loss: It evaluates the easiness by which users regain the
ability to login if the login credentials are lost or forgotten. Authentication based
on N RT T is completely transparent to users as they do not keep or memorize any
authentication credentials. It is highly unlikely (as proved by the results of our
extensive experiments) for a legitimate user to fail login after three trials. However,
in the very rare case of sudden and permanent changes in profile parameters, N RT T based authentication (AMAN as introduced in 2.4) generates new reference profiles
after verifying the identity of the user using either: (i) out-of-band channels such as
email or SMS, (ii) other complementary authentication schemes that may have been
augmented with AMAN such as browser fingerprinting, (iii) if none of the previous
options are available, a user can re-register with the web service as a new user. On
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the other hand, the loss of fingerprint credentials (e.g., physical damage to fingers) is
permanent and impossible to be regained.

2.6.3

Deploy-ability

Accessible: It evaluates whether users may be hindered from using the scheme due
to disabilities or any other physical conditions. Again, N RT T -based authentication
scheme is completely transparent to users and is easily accessible irrespective of any
disabilities. On the other hand, SAC and biometric factor based schemes are less
accessible. For example, blind users cannot read SAC from phones, and users who
broke their fingers cannot scan fingerprints.

Mature: It evaluates whether the scheme has been tested and deployed in
large scale real-world scenarios. N RT T -based authentication (AMAN) is a new
authentication mechanism and hence this property does not apply. However, AMAN
has been extensively tested with relatively good size prototypes (155 non-mobile users
and 63 residential WiFi users). SAC is widely deployed but biometric factor based
authentication has not been used for remote authentication.

Non-Proprietary: It evaluates whether the scheme requires licensing due to
intellectual property or royalties.

Similar to SAC, N RT T -based authentication

(AMAN) is an open framework that can be freely implemented by any interested
entity. On the other hand, many biometric authentication schemes have patented
hardware/software.

2.7
2.7.1

Related Work

Security Usage of N RT T

In [125], a packet delay-based scheme is proposed to detect man-in-the-middle (MitM)
attacks. The delay is calculated using TCP packet headers with the assumption that
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the delay increases in the presence of MitM attacker. However, packet delay can
easily be manipulated by, for example, pinging the network service.

2.7.2

IP Based Geolocating

Recently, Gmail has launched a service that enables its users to detect suspicious
account login activities based on their IP information [8]. A suspicious attempt is
detected by matching the relevant IP address(es) to a broad geographical location(s).
However, IP-based verification (fixing a range of IPs) can be easily bypassed via (1)
proxy-server; (2) VPN; (3) IP-hijacking. Many web clients are behind proxies (or
VPN). The client and the proxy may be far apart. For example, the AOL network,
which has a centralized cluster of proxies at one location (Virginia) for serving client
hosts located all across the U.S. [101]. BGP/IP hijacking is much more common
than current researchers think and it is hard to be detected in the form of local BGP
hijacking [126] [48]. Furthermore, IP address based authentication suffers many other
limitations due to current Internet infrastructure including: (1) extensive use of NAT,
especially the use of Carrier Grade NAT (CGN) or Large Scale NAT (LSN) [57]; (2)
complex and various IP address configuration policies by different ISPs. Therefore,
IP address based authentication is more suitable for LAN other than general web
service authentication.

2.7.3

Delay Based Geolocating

The authors of [67] propose a topology based approach to estimate the geographic
location of a certain Internet host. Specifically, they ping the target from a set of
landmarks. Then, based on the end-to-end delay, the target is considered closest
to the landmark with the shortest latency. The primary result is that geolocation
is more accurate when topology is considered (e.g., using traceroute, topology and
per-hop latencies). Francis et al. [45] use traceroute command to collect round trip
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delay data then find the nearest host in terms of low latency. GeoPing[77] provides
a list of end-to-end delays from a target to a set of geographic locations via ping
command to reveal how close a target is to all the landmarks.
However, all of the methods mentioned above use naive measurement of the
(e.g., Ping or traceroute) delay which is not practical on the Internet (e.g., probably
to be blocked). In addition, none of these method consider network instabilities when
using the latency data.

2.8

Conclusions

In this work, we proposed a novel, secure and usable web authentication factor
based on Network Round Trip Time (N RT T ) that strengthens the security of web
service authentication by offering robust defenses against password compromise.
We introduced a novel network component, delay mask, which turns N RT T into
a secure and robust authentication factor.

More importantly, we designed and

implemented various algorithms, with the help of multiple DM deployments, to
alleviate network instabilities and expand authentication sample space of N RT T .
The benchmark comparative results (Appendix 2.6) showed that N RT T has superior
security, usability, and deploy-ability properties among state-of-the-art authentication
factors.
We designed, implemented and deployed a prototype for a use case of two-factor
authentication (AMAN) with legacy passwords as first factor and N RT T as a second
factor. The experimental results showed that AMAN can achieve false positive and
false negative rates as low as 0, while maintaining the login latency overhead below
185 ms.
In the future, we plan to make AMAN completely end user agnostic by replacing
passwords with mechanisms that can automatically collect unique user characteristics.
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Such techniques may utilize biometric tools such as typing behavior, screen resolution,
device signatures and others.
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CHAPTER 3
A NOVEL AND ROBUST PHISHING DETECTION FEATURE

3.1

Introduction

Phishing, one form of cyber-attacks, continues to be a growing concern not only to
cyber security specialists but also to e-business users and owners. The severity of
such cyber attack vector is continuously growing with the exponential increase in
digital information generation and the increased reliance of people and business on
cyber space. The Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) has seen rapid growth in
the number of unique phishing websites detected from 2014 to 2016 [23]. The average
annual growth rate is 97.36% and is expected to continue to grow. Estimates of
annual direct financial loss to the US economy caused by phishing activities range
from $61 million to $3 billion [58].
To mitigate the increasing damage caused by phishing, a broad range of
anti-phishing mechanisms have been proposed over the past two decades. These
anti-phishing techniques can be categorized into three broad groups [20]: (1) Detective
solutions (e.g., website filtering); (2) Preventive solutions (e.g., strong authentication
[69, 102, 43, 41, 42, 49, 68]); and (3) Corrective solutions (e.g., Site takedown
[73, 72]). In this work, we focus on detective solutions. More specifically, we look
at software-based phishing detection schemes that are specialized in identifying and
classifying phishing websites. This class of approaches is arguably more important
than other approaches because it helps in reducing human errors. Preventative and
corrective solutions take a different approach, but if the user behind the keyboard has
been successfully tricked by a phishing attempt, and willingly submitted sensitive
information, then no firewall, encryption software, certificates, or authentication
mechanism can help in preventing the attack from materializing [58]. Software-based
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phishing detection also delivers improved results compared to detection by user
education (e.g., [78], [79], [116]) because phishing attacks normally aim at exploiting
human weaknesses [75].

For example, a study of phishing detection using user

education [115] shows a 29% false negative rate (F N R) for the best performance,
while the software based approaches that are surveyed by the same study have F N R
in the range of 0.1% to 10%. For this reason, we focus our study on software based
phishing detection systems, and the term “phishing detection” will refer only to this
form of detection in the rest of the dissertation.
In this work, we propose a new phishing detection feature based on the Network
Round Trip Time, dubbed as N RT T . N RT T has been introduced in [61] as a reliable
and robust second web authentication factor. N RT T simply captures the network
round trip time that packets take in its journey from one Internet connected host to
another and back to the original sender. We propose here a two-phase approach based
on N RT T to detect phishing web sites. In the first phase, the targeted victim site
is identified through content analysis of the phishing website, URL characteristics,
spam email content analysis, or combination of them. Victim website identification
is well studied in literature (e.g., [87] [131] [90]), and hence we capitalize on the
state-of-the-art mechanisms to build our victim identification component. In the
second phase, we compare the average N RT T values of both the phishing website
and the targeted victim website from a certain vantage point. If the difference between
the two N RT T averages is greater than a threshold, the link is highly likely a phishing
link. The intuition here is that the phishing website is likely to be hosted on a server
different from that of the victim website, and hence, they will experience different
average N RT T .
We summarize our contributions in this work as follows:

• Introduce a novel and highly usable Phishing detection feature based on
Network Round Trip Time, N RT T .
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• Propose a new phishing detection framework by carefully combining Phishing
detection features based on the most recent Phishing trends and the analysis of
state-of-the-art Phishing detection features.
• Present an algorithm to identify the target website from suspicious URLs.
• Provide comparative evaluation of the proposed scheme against state-of-the-art
schemes and show that our scheme not only has comparable performance results
but also can neutralize advanced Phishing attacks.

3.2
3.2.1

Background

State-of-the-art Phishing Attacks

In this section, we first present the various definitions of phishing, then we introduce
some statistics about phishing between January 2010 and June 2016. Finally, we
describe the phishing ecosystem.

What is Phishing? There is no consensus on how phishing should be defined.
Different phishing definitions lead to different research directions and approaches
(e.g., email filtering or website detection). It is important to clearly identify the
target of any phishing detection approach to avoid confusion about its applicability
in different scenarios. The target and scope of phishing detection approaches can be
analyzed from the definition of phishing which has been adopted by such approaches.
Therefore, presenting a background on the different definitions of phishing can help
the readers understand the scope and the capabilities of different approaches. Table
3.1 summarizes the popular definitions of phishing. On one hand, the definitions of
PhishTank [100], APWG [23], Xiang et al. [136], Tameshe et al. [106] cover the
majority of cases in which phishers aim at stealing sensitive personal information
such as authentication credentials. Table 3.2 shows the comparison of those phishing
definitions based on phishing target and phishing strategy. The most dominant
phishing strategies are social engineering (e.g., through fraudulent emails) and
technical subterfuge (e.g., malware infection). However, sophisticated techniques
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Table 3.1 Most Popular Definitions of Phishing
Definition
PhishTank [100]

Phishing is a fraudulent attempt, usually made through
email, to steal your personal information.

APWG [3]

Phishing is a criminal mechanism employing both social
engineering and technical subterfuge to steal consumers’
personal identity data & financial account credentials.

Xiang et al. [136]

Phishing is a form of identity theft, in which criminals
build replicas of target Web sites and lure unsuspecting
victims to disclose their sensitive information like
passwords, personal identification numbers(PINs), etc..

Whittaker et al. [133]

A phishing page is any web page that, without permission,
alleges to act on behalf of a third party with the
intention of confusing viewers into performing an action
with which the viewer would only trust a true agent of
the third party.

Khonji et al. [75]

Phishing is a type of computer attack that communicates
socially engineered messages to humans via electronic
communication channels in order to persuade them to
perform certain actions for the attacker’s benefit.

Ramesh et al. [106]

Phishing is a fraudulent act to acquire sensitive
information from unsuspecting users by masking as a
trustworthy entity in an electronic commerce.
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Table 3.2 Targets and Strategies of Phishing

PhishTank [100]

Target

Strategy

Personal information

Social engineering

Identity data,
APWG [3]

Financial account

Social engineering

credentials
Xiang et al. [136]

Sensitive information

Not specified

Whittaker et al. [133]

Not specified

Not specified

Khonji et al. [75]

Not specified

Social engineering

Rameshe et al. [106]

Sensitive information

Not specified

(e.g., pharming [65]) are also used to harvest users’ personal information from the
Internet. On the other hand, the definitions of Whittaker et al. [133] and Khonji
et al. [75] do not limit the attacker’s target (e.g., sensitive personal information).
They describe the phishing strategy (e.g., phishing website or socially engineered
messages) without stating a specific phishing target (e.g., only state the attackers’
benefit). To sum up, the definition of Whittaker et al.[133] is the most general among
those reviewed, while APWG [23] defines the most commonly used phishing attacks
in a specific manner.

How Does Phishing Work? In this section, we introduce the ecosystem of
phishing in terms of phishing process, actors involved, their actions and interactions.
(i) Phishing Process: In a generic/traditional phishing scenario (i.e., massive
email phishing campaigns), an attacker hosts a fake website, and presents users of
a web service with convincing emails containing a link to the fake website. When a
user of the web service opens the link and enters her sensitive data, data is collected
by the server hosting the fake website.
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As illustrated in Figure 3.1, Mihai and Giurea [94] suggest that a generic
phishing process can be identified into five steps: (1) Reconnaissance: Phishers
look for famous web service brands with a broad customer base; (2) Weaponization:
Phishers design the selected phishing websites and social engineer on email spam;
(3) Distribution: Phishers deliver emails to the victims; (4) Exploitation: Phishers
exploit weaknesses of humans to lure the victims into phishing traps via socially
engineered emails. (5) Exfiltration: Phishers collect sensitive data from the phishing
databases.
Unlike generic phishing attacks, spear phishing targets particular individuals
or organizations [31] [128] [103]. Spear phishing attacks typically extract sensitive
data from their victims by attaching a type of malware to emails or in the phishing
website. Industry statistics indicate that spear phishing attacks have a success rate
of 19%, while the success rate of generic phishing attacks is less than 5% [103].
For the purpose of this dissertation, we will not consider email filtering (e.g.,
[137], [26], [85]) as a phishing detection method. Our focus is on detection of website
phishing for both generic and spear phishing attacks.
(ii) Phishing Actors: There are six actors involved in a typical phishing life
cycle (see Figure 3.2), as defined in the following paragraphs:

• Phisher: Individuals or organizations that conduct phishing attacks in order
to obtain a certain type of benefit, such as financial gain, identity hiding (e.g.,
refers to the situation in which phishers do not use the stolen identities directly,
but rather sell them to interested criminals and cyber attackers.), fame and
notoriety, etc. [75][138].
• Web service provider: Companies that provide a certain type of service (e.g.,
email, social network, e-banking, on-line shopping, etc.) on the Internet (usually
through a website).
• Web service subscriber: Customers who subscribe to web services provided
by the web service provider. Subscribers are the potential targets of traditional
phishing attacks.
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Figure 3.1 Illustration of the phishing process.
• Web hosting provider: Companies that provide website hosting services to
web service companies.
• Anti-phishing institutes: Institutes that support those tackling the phishing
menace and provide advice on anti-phishing controls and information on current
trends [3].
• Spear phishing targets: Specific individuals or companies targeted by
phishers.
Each actor involved in the phishing process has different actions and reactions
(summarized in Table 3.3). Phishers try to use sophisticated techniques to evade
phishing detection approaches (e.g., DNS poisoning [19]). In addition, there is a
growing trend in which phishers have decoupled the process of phishing website
hosting from the process of sending phishing emails in order to evade the anti-phishing
solutions (Han, Kheir, & Balzarotti [55]).
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Table 3.3 Operations of Different Players Involved in Phishing
Basic Operations

Advanced Operations

1.Data collection
A

1. Evasion of anti-phishing
2.Website development
techniques
3.Email engineering

B

1.Blacklist announcement

1.User behavior detection
2.Strong authentications

C

1.Human detection

1.Phishing detection toolbar

2.Browser filter
D
E

F

1.Policy enforcement

1.Brand monitoring

1.Phishing data analysis

1.Law enforcement

2.Anti-Phishing solutions

2.Government coalition

1.Employee training

1.Email filtering
2.Phishing detection software

A: Phisher; B: Web service provider; C: Web service subscriber;
D: Web hosting provider; E: Anti-Phishing institute;
F: Spear Phishing targets
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Figure 3.2 Players involved in the phishing process.
Web service providers usually announce blacklists of phishing websites and
recommend users to use strong authentication schemes (e.g., [22, 70, 43, 41, 42]).
Additionally, web service subscribers highly depend on browser filters (e.g., Google
Safe Browser [9]) and other third party anti-phishing toolbars (e.g., Netcraft [2]) to
detect and block phishing attempts.
The role of web hosting providers is rather ambiguous in the phishing process.
Reputable providers usually enforce strict “Terms of Use” and avail certain antiphishing solutions (e.g., brand monitoring [20]). Due to financial constraints, many
free-to-use web hosting providers may not be able to afford deploying good antiphishing security measures, which leaves their customers not only vulnerable, but
even worse, attractive targets for phishing.
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Anti-phishing institutes collect and analyze phishing data (e.g., suspicious
websites reported by users) from various sources (e.g., users’ reports via anti-phishing
toolbars), and provide anti-phishing suggestions and solutions (e.g., up-to-date
phishing website blacklist, phishing detection toolbars, etc.). In addition, they may
also cooperate with government agencies such as public security and law enforcement
to detect and prevent cyber attacks [3].

What is the Current State of Phishing? According to phishing activity trends
reports published by APWG [23] from Jan. 2010 to Jun. 2016 (shown in Figure 3.3),
the number of unique phishing websites established per month increased significantly
since 2015 (i.e., the average number for 2016 is 2.93 times the average from prior
years). It is clear that phishers profited from this type of cyber-attacks, which
result in financial loss for both web subscribers and business owners. Therefore,
agile techniques to mitigate phishing will continue to be a pressing need.
Phishing attacks tend to empoly advanced techniques to lure web service users
into their rogue websites. Using the database from Trend Micro web reputation
technology, Pajares [12] reports the number of phishing sites that use HTTPS
connections increased significantly in 2014 compared to 2010 (shown in Figure 3.4).
Attackers become more cautious and attentive when designing phishing websites to
evade existing phishing detection methods [1]. Some phishing groups are capable and
desire to perform more advanced phishing attacks. Avalanche (commonly known as
the Avalanche Gang) is a criminal syndicate involved in phishing attacks [135]. In
2010, APWG reported that Avalanche was responsible for two-thirds of all phishing
attacks in the second half of 2009, describing it as “one of the most sophisticated and
damaging on the Internet” and “the world’s most prolific phishing gang” [18]. It has
been discovered that Avalanche uses different techniques to evade the anti-phishing
mechanisms.
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In addition, more and more sophisticated techniques are being used to
implement phishing attacks. For example, the pharming attack, a refined version
of phishing attacks, is designed to steal users’ credentials by redirecting them to
fraudulent websites using DNS-based techniques [47, 73]. Many computer security
experts predict that the use of pharming attacks will continue to grow as more
criminals embrace these techniques [65].
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Figure 3.3 The number of unique phishing sites per month from Jan. 2010 to Jun.
2016.

3.2.2

Life Cycle of Phishing Detection

In this dissertation, we do not incorporate phishing detection approaches that rely on
user education due to their poor performance. In addition, we do not cover phishing
detection methods that perform email filtering because it is a different detection theme
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Figure 3.4 The number of phishing sites that use HTTPS. Re-printed from [12].
that warrants a separate comprehensive study on its own. we reemphasize here that
our focus is on the area of software-based phishing detection which aims at detecting
or blocking phishing websites.
The life-cycle of software-based phishing detection is illustrated in Figure 3.5.
Starting from the initial inputs, the detection scheme extracts phishing detection
features (or called heuristics) and/or blacklists from various sources (e.g., URL
related information, trusted third party, WHOIS server, etc.) via different feature
mining approaches (e.g., search engines, target identification algorithms, etc.).
Then, it applies different data mining algorithms and/or proposes various detection
strategies to the engineered features to achieve its objectives (e.g., identifying phishing
links, blocking phishing websites, etc.). To evaluate the performance of phishing
detection schemes, various evaluation datasets are collected from different sources
(e.g., PhishTank, Yahoo directory, etc.). Finally, leveraging the collected datasets and
following various validation strategies (e.g., cross validation), the proposed scheme is
evaluated based on multiple metrics (e.g., False Positive Rate, False Negative Rate,
etc.).
In the coming sections, following the life cycle of software-based phishing
detection schemes, we present a comprehensive study of the phishing detection
research from five different perspectives, namely, classification of phishing detection
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techniques, validation datasets, detection features, detection techniques and detection
criteria.

Heuristic
Features

URL/Blacklist
Data Sources

Blacklist

Phishing/Legitimate
Data Sources

Feature Mining Approach

Machine
Learning
Algorithm

Detection
Strategy

Evaluation Data Set

Evaluation Criteria
Validation Strategy

Figure 3.5 Life Cycle of typical phishing detection schemes.

3.3

Phishing Detection: Feature Analysis and Selection

In this section, we summarize the most commonly used features taken from various
Phishing detection approaches. Then, we introduce a new phishing detection feature
based on N RT T . Finally, based on the analysis of the presented features, we perform
careful selection from these features to build a new Phishing detection framework.
We note that even though the list of atomic features presented here is not exhaustive,
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it includes the atomic features used in most of the state-of-the-art Phishing detection
approaches.

3.3.1

Atomic Phishing Detection Features

URL-based textual features: A URL (Uniform Resource Locator) is used to
locate website resources. URLs contain many features that have been widely used
in various Phishing detection approaches [28] [136] [133], here are some most used
features:

• URL replaced with IP address: Some Phishing websites do not use hostnames, but rather use IP address directly to locate the fake site. Such behavior
usually used either to obfuscate the legitimate URL or simply to reduce cost.
• The Length of URL: Phishing websites usually have longer URLs comparing
to legitimate websites.
• Number of dots and sub domains: Phishing URLs often contain more
”dots” and sub-domains than legitimate.
• Number of re-directions: Malicious URLs often have multiple URL redirects
in order to evade detection by blacklists.
• Use of HTTPS protocol: Legitimate websites often use HTTPS protocol
while Phishing sites usually do not.
URL-based domain name features:
• Domain name similarity: A measure of the similarity between a potential
Phishing domain name and a target domain name. The similarity can be
measured in many ways. For example, it can be measured based on the Edit
Distance between the two domains [36]. The Edit Distance is the number of
characters that need to be inserted or deleted in order to transform one domain
into another. The smaller the number of insertions and deletions, the higher
the similarity.
WHOIS information: WHOIS is a query and response protocol that is widely
used for querying databases that store information about registered websites [89].

70

• Registered information about domain names: For most of the observed
Phishing sites, either the registration record is not available in WHOIS
databases or the claimed identity is not accurate in the record.
• Age of Domain: Many of the observed Phishing websites have domains that
are registered only a few days before Phishing emails are sent out, that is, short
lived domains are likely to be Phishing domains.
Geographic information: Geographical location is one of the most commonly
used indicators in detecting Phishing because Phishing websites are likely to be hosted
in locations different from those of legitimate websites [2].

• IP-based Geographical location: Netcraft [2] provides location information
(i.e., IP-based country information) to help identifying fraudulent URLs. For
example, the real bankofamerica.com is unlikely to be hosted in Russia.
Website textual content: The textual content of the Phishing website can be
used to determine the identity of the target website.

• Term frequency: In [136], the author proposed a content-based approach
to detect Phishing websites based on the TF-IDF (term frequency, inverse
document frequency) information with the help of Google search engine.
– TF-IDF of each term on a suspected web page is calculated.
– Top 5 terms with highest TF-IDF values are selected.
– The top 5 terms are submitted into a search engine and store the domain
names of the n-first returned entries.
– If the suspected domain name is found within the n returned results, then
the site is considered legitimate.
Website visual content:
• Visual similarity: In [91], the authors present a technique to visually compare
a suspected Phishing page with the legitimate one via a set of visual features.
These features include (i) each visible text section with its visual attributes,
(ii) each visible image, and (iii) the overall visual look-and-feel (i.e., the larger
composed image) of the web page visible in the viewport (i.e., the part of the
web page that is visible in the browser window).
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3.3.2

Network Round Trip Time

The usage of N RT T as a feature for Phishing detection is straightforward. We
simply compare the differences between the N RT T statistics (i.e., mean and standard
deviation) of the phishing website and that of the its targeting website based on the
algorithms discussed in Section 3.4.
Gaussian approximation: It has been observed that the round trip network
communications latency approximately follows a Gaussian distribution [37] [61].
Based on this assumption, the larger the number of profiling signals, the more
accurate the profile. However, the larger the number of profiling signals, the higher
the bandwidth overhead consumed by the verifier. Therefore, it is critical to find a
profiling sample size that leads to an acceptable trade-off between profile accuracy
and bandwidth overhead.
According to the work in [61], for a Gaussian distribution that has standard
deviation σ and mean µ. The minimum sample size N , that produces a mean x,
within a certain error tolerance δ, with a certain confidence level 1 − α, can be
computed as:
N ≥ (Z1−α /δ)2 σ 2

(3.1)

Where Z is the critical value for the normal distribution. In other words, for a sample
size of N , we are 1-α confident that the measured mean (x) will fall in the range of:
µ−δ ≤x≤µ+δ

(3.2)

For example, to be 99% confident that x is in the range of ±δ = ±0.5·σ (i.e., the error
tolerance is half of the standard deviation), the number of measurements should be:
N ≥ (Z1−α /δ)2 σ 2 = 4·Z0.99 ≈ 27. In other words, with more than 27 profiling signals,
we are 99% confident that real-time profile mean is within 0.5·σ from reference profile
mean.
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Network instabilities: N RT T measurements should be robust enough to resist
manipulation attacks and should cope with network instabilities to prevent high false
positive. These N RT T challenges has been well studied and address in [61], where
the authors define three types of network instabilities provide solution that efficiently
address each type of these instabilities.
Instantaneous instabilities cause transient changes in N RT T and hence, they
only affects a few of the profiling signals. This type of instability can be addressed
through outlier filtering based on median absolute deviation[84] .
Long-term instabilities are instabilities that persist long enough to affect all or
most of the of profiling signals yet not permanent. These instabilities are mainly
caused by traffic congestion at the local network segment connecting to the network
backbone. This type of instability can be addressed by establishing multiple profiles
as detailed in [61].
Routing instabilities will result in permanent changes in network communications latency due to, for example, permanent network routing changes. It has
been shown in many previous researches [38] [81] [109] [82] [114], that only a small
portion of the Internet is responsible for the vast majority of the routing instabilities
and these routing changes exhibit a strong temporal periodicity, despite the growth
of the Internet. We can leverage such periodicity and temporal properties to create
long-term dynamic temporal profiles.

System design for N RT T measurement: We propose a system prototype
(Figure 3.6) to turn N RT T into a robust feature for the proposed phishing detection
framework. The prototype consists of four entities: (1) the user (represented by
a plug-in); (2) the verifier; (3) the locating servers; and (4) the website server.
The verifier and the locating servers form a phishing detection network which are
third trusted parties. This is a valid design because most of the client side phishing
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detection toolbar providers host their own servers that interact with the user’s browser
plug-in (e.g., blacklist updating, user feedback uploading, etc.)
Using the proposed system, the high level measurement procedure involves:
(1) the user installs a browser plug-in and active it; (2) the user opens the faked
website link; (3) the plug-in collects the URL of the faked website and sends it to
the verifier; (4) the verifier goes to the faked website and finds out the target website
(e.g., PayPal) using the algorithm described in Section 3.4.2; (5) the verifier sends
testing requests to multiple Locating Servers (LS) to measure the N RT T from each
LS to the URL hosting server; (6) the verifier leverages the N RT T measurements
together with the proposed phishing detection framework (as detailed in Section 3.4)
to identify potential phishing websites.

Figure 3.6 System model for the measurement of N RT T .

3.3.3

Selection of the Features

In this section, we perform the analysis and selection of the phishing detection
features for the proposed framework. First of all, we classify all the features into two
categories, namely, Identification Dependent Features (i.e., IDF ) and Identification
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Independent Features (i.e., IIF ). Together with the proposed target identification
algorithm (Section 3.4.2), IDF could achieve better detection accuracy. For example,
in [36], the proposed phishing detection toolbar SpoofGuard leverages the domain
name similarity score. However, since it does not provide targeting identification
of the phishing website, it simply compares the phishing domain name with the
the domains in the most recent browser history entries. And this results in bad
performance.
The URL-based features and WHOIS features are still powerful in classifying the
phishing websites due to the attackers’ laziness and their limited resources. However,
webpage content based features suffer from more difficulties than usual [98]. For
example, the attacker can encrypt the phishing website source code to evade website
content based phishing detection methods. Geographic location is a very important
phishing detection feature because the phishing website is most likely hosted in a
place other than the one of the legitimate website [2]. The usage of N RT T provides
similar ability comparing to the IP based geo-location. In addition, it provides
better detection accuracy (e.g., current IP based geo-location schemes only provide
country/state level information) and it could defend against IP/BGP hijacking, which
is even more common than researchers think according to the work in [127]. The
selected phishing detection features are summarized in Table 3.4.

3.4
3.4.1

Phishing Detection Framework Design

Design Overview

In this section, we present the system design of the proposed Phishing detection
framework. As depicted in Figure 3.7, the proposed framework comprises three
modules: (1) Phishing target identification module (TIM); (2) identification dependent
phishing detection module (IDDM); and (3) identification independent phishing
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Table 3.4 Selected Phishing Detection Features for the Proposed Framework
Set

Feature
Network Communications

Symbol
N RT T

Round Trip Time
IDF
Domain Name Similarity

DN S

# of dots in the URL

Ndots

IP address in the URL

IPurl

# of redirections

Nre

of the URL
IIF

Use of HTTPS

P

Age of the Domain

A

Registering name in WHOIS
Length of the URL
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Rdomain
Lurl

detection module (IIDM). The detailed Phishing detection procedure is presented
in Algorithm 1.

Figure 3.7 Design overview.

• TIM: the Phishing target identification and classification module is responsible
of identifying the target website from input URL. The identified result is in
the form of domain names (e.g., www.paypal.com) and it is the premise of
the identification dependent phishing detection (IDDM). Detailed design and
analysis of TIM are presented in Section 3.4.2.
• IDDM: the identification dependent phishing detection module performs the
detection algorithm for all the features that require the target identification of
the website (i.e., Set IDF). Detailed design and analysis of IDDM is presented
in Section 3.4.3.
• IIDM: If TIM cannot verify the identification of the website (less than 5%
of according to the experimental results), IIDM will take over the control
and perform phishing detection based on website identification independent
features (i.e., Set IIF). On the other hand, if TIM successfully identifies the
target website, IDDM will first handle the identification dependent features
then forward the results (i.e., scoreIDDM ) to IIDM for final decision. Detailed
design and analysis of IIDM are presented in Section 3.4.4
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Algorithm 1 Phishing Detection Procedure
Input: U RLinput
Output: Phishing detection decision: True or False
1: procedure
2:

Send U RLinput to TIM, Dl = call Algorithm 2

3:

if TIM successfully identifies the target then

4:

TIM sends the Dl to IDDM.

5:

IDDM performs Algorithm 3

6:

IDDM forwards scoreIDDM to IIDM

7:

IIDM performs Algorithm

8:

if scoreIIDM ≥ threshold then
return False

9:
10:

else
return True

11:
12:
13:

end if
else

14:

TIM forwards the control to IDDM.

15:

IIDM performs Algorithm

16:

if scoreIIDM ≥ threshold then
return False

17:
18:

else
return True

19:
20:
21:

end if
end if

22: end procedure
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3.4.2

Target Identification

Identification process: The proposed website target identification and classification module (TIM) aims at finding out the identification, in terms of target domain
name (e.g.,www.paypal.com), based on the input URL. In this work, TIM first extracts
a list of keywords from several selected website contents. The selected website contents
include:

• U RLinput : the input URL.
• Ttitle : the title of the website.
• Tcopyright : the copyright field of the website.
• Ttext : other website text contents, including: pure text, text from the hyperlink,
text extracted from the images.
After obtaining the list of keywords, TIM tries to match the list of keywords to a
pre-defined web service brands whitelist which is further mapped to its corresponding
domain name (e.g, Paypal → www.paypal.com). This whitelist includes 92 most
phished websites information which are collected from 37321 verified phishing websites
of PhishTank [100]. If the extracted list of keywords has no match to the whitelist,
TIM will apply the list of keywords to a searching engine (i.e., Google search) and
record the domain names of the top N (e.g., N = 3) searching results.
As depicted in Figure 3.8 and Algorithm 2., the website target identification
and classification module (TIM) consists of 6 sub-modules:(1) Module 1 simply
records the input URL as a string in SetA; (2) Module 2 extracts the page title
Ttitle and copyright field Tcopyright from the HTML source code then records them as
SetB; (3) Module 3 calculates the term frequency of the all other web page texts
Ttext , then saves the results as SetC (i.e., from text only) and SetD (i.e., from the
image extracted text); (4) Module 4 performs the whitelist matching among all the
sets (i.e, SetA, B, C, D), and saves the hitting list as ListA. (5) Module 5: if there is
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no matching resolved from Module 4, Module 5 will construct ListB in the form of
(SetB, SetC, SetD); (6) Module 6 maps ListA or ListB into corresponding domain
names based on the whitelist or the top N (N = 3) searching result, respectively.

Figure 3.8 TIM working flow.

Special Cases: We note that there are special scenarios that TIM cannot generate
any outputs (i.e., Dl = ∅), for example, the website source code is protected via
encryption and there is no image on the website. Under such scenario, TIM will fail
to provide outputs and IIDM will take over the control of the detection process as
depicted in Figure 3.7. Alternatively, we can take the screen shoot of the webpage
for further analysis. However, it will increase the system complexity and detection
time overhead. In addition, according to our investigation of 500 legitimate websites,
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Algorithm 2 Target Identification Algorithm
Input: U RLinput
Output: Target domain name Dl
1: procedure
2:

Feed U RLinput to Module 1 to 3

3:

Module 1 to 3 outputs SetA, B, C, D.

4:

Module 4 matches SetA, B, C, D with the whitelist.

5:

if There are matches in Module 4 then

6:

Record the matches in ListA
Module 6 maps listA into corresponding domain
names and records the result as Dl .

7:
8:

else
Create ListB in the form of (SetB, SetC, SetD).
Module 6 applies ListB to the searching engine
and records the top N domain names as Dl .

9:
10:

end if
Return: Dl

11: end procedure
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encryption is not used by any of these legitimate web services and we can confidently
conclude a phishing. Another possible scenario is that we disable the text extraction
from the website images in order to reduce the overall detection overhead.

3.4.3

Identification Dependent Phishing Detection Module

After obtaining the target identification output (i.e., Dl ) from TIM, IDDM takes
over the control of the detection process. IDDM performs evaluation of two target
identification dependent features, namely, normalized domain name similarity score
and the N RT T Gaussian PDF score. After the evaluation, IDDM will forward
the results to IIDM for final analysis. Detailed evaluation process is presented in
Algorithm 3.

Normalized Domain Name Similarity: First, IDDM extracts the domain name
embedded in the U RLinput and records it as string ai with length |a|. Then, it denotes
Dl as string bj with length |b|. Finally, IDDM calculates the normalized domain name
similarity score (scoreDN S ) using equation (1) and (2) based on the edit distance of
the two strings.



max(i, j)
if min(i, j) = 0









Da,b (i − 1, j) + 1



Da,b (i, j) =


min Da,b (i, j − 1) + 1 otherwise










 Da,b (i − 1, j − 1) + 1(a 6=b )
i
j

scoreDN S =

max(|a|, |b|) − Da,b (|a|, |b|)
max(|a|, |b|)

(1)

(2)

N RT T Gaussian PDF score: As detailed in Section 3.3.2, the IDDM builds m
corresponding real-time profiles for the website represented by U RLinput , denoted as
U (µ, σ). Then, IDDM retrieves the pre-stored N RT T profiles (i.e., to reduce usage

82

of the bandwidth) or measures the real time N RT T profiles (i.e., to alleviate the
effect of N RT T instability or in the case of no pre-stored reference profiles) for the
websites in Dl , denoted as V (x, y). Finally, IDDM computes the distance between
U (µ, σ) and V (x, y). To measure the distance, we use the Gaussian PDF algorithm
[123] as shown in equation (3):
i=m

scoreN RT T

2
1 X − (xi −µ)
=
e 2·σ2
m i=1

(3)

We note that, there may be multiple domain names in Dl because of the
uncertainty of TIM (e.g., keywords matching, top N searching). Under this scenario,
IDDM simply calculates scoreDN S and scoreN RT T for each website in Dl and keeps
the highest score respectively. This operation helps to decrease the false positive rate
of the phishing detection system.

3.4.4

Identification Independent Phishing Detection Module

The IIDM performs the evaluations of all the target identification independent
features (i.e., Set IIF). It computes the corresponding evaluation score for each of
the features in Set IIF. The corresponding evaluation score calculations are presented
in Table 3.5. Finally, IIDM calculates the final score scoref based on equation (11).
The decision algorithm is presented in Algorithm 3.5.
There are three types of evaluation scores computed in the proposed framework:

• Comparative score: CS = scoreN RT T + scoreDN S . CS depends on the
outputs of the IDDM that requires the target identification of the input URL.
• WHOIS score: W S = score6 · score7 . For the website being examined, if the
there is no registering information in the WHOIS record (i.e., score6 = 0), it is
most likely to be a phishing site and we can confidently set W S = 0.
P
• URL score: U S = score1 · i=5
i=2 (scorei ). For the website being tested, if the
corresponding URL contains IP address, it is most likely to be a phishing site
and we can confidently set U S = 0.
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Algorithm 3 Identification-Dependent Feature Evaluation
Input: ai = Domain name of U RLinput )
1:

bi = Dl
Output: scoreDN S and scoreN RT T

2: procedure
3:

Da,b (i, 0) = 0, Da,b (0, j) = 0

4:

for i ∈ [1, 2, ..., |b|] do

5:
6:
7:

for j ∈ [1, 2, ..., |a|] do
Da,b (i, j) = Equation (1)
end for

8:

end for

9:

scoreDN S =

max(|a|,|b|)−Da,b (|a|,|b|)
max(|a|,|b|)

10:

scoreN RT T = 0

11:

for j ∈ [1, 2, ..., m] do

12:

xj = xj − 4T
−

13:

scoreN RT T + = e

(xj −µ)2
2·σ 2
j

14:

end for

15:

scoreN RT T = scoreN RT T /m

16:

Return: scoreDN S and scoreN RT T

17: end procedure
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Table 3.5 Evaluation Score Calculation Formulas for Identification Independent
Features
Features
IPurl

Lurl

Calculation Formula


 0 if U RLinput contains IP

score1 =

score2 =


1


1

if Lurl <= Lthreshold


Lthreshold /Lurl

Ndots



1

score3 =

score4 =



1

score5 =

Rdomain

score6 =

score7 =

(6)

otherwise



1

(8)

otherwise
if A <= Athreshold


Athreshold /A otherwise


 1 if Rdomain exists

0

otherwise
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(7)

otherwise



1 if HTTPS is used

0

A

otherwise

if Nre <= N Rthreshold


N Rthreshold /Nre

P

(5)

if Ndots <= Nthreshold


Nthreshold /Nurl

Nre

(4)

otherwise

(9)

(10)

The final score is calculated as:
scoref =

w1 · CS + w2 · W S + w3 · U S
w1 + w2 + w3

Algorithm 3 Decision Algorithm
Input: U RLinput , scoreDN S and scoreN RT T
Output: Detection decision: True or False
1: procedure
2:

Compute CS = scoreN RT T + scoreDN S

3:

Compute W S = score6 · score7 , where
score6 = Call equation (9)

4:
5:
6:

score7 = Call equation (10)
P
Compute U S = score1 · i=5
i=2 (scorei ), where

7:

score2 = Call equation (5)

8:

score3 = Call equation (6)

9:

score4 = Call equation (7)

10:

score5 = Call equation (8)

11:

Calculate the final score:
scoref =

12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:

w1 ·CS+w2 ·W S+w3 ·U S
w1 +w2 +w3

if scoref ≥ threshold then
return True ← Legitimate
else
return False ← Phishing
end if

18: end procedure
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(11)

Figure 3.9 N RT T distributions for five popular web services brands; Blue dots →
Legitimate; Red dots → Phishing.
3.5

Performance Evaluation

In this section, we present the performance evaluation of the selected and proposed
phishing detection features, the target identification method and the proposed
phishing detection framework.

3.5.1

Evaluation Data Sets

We obtain the evaluation data sets mainly from three sources: (1) 2000 to 32683
verified phishing websites provided by PhishTank [100]; (2) Top 500 most visited
legitimate websites list from Alexa (i.e., www.alexa.com); and (3) 142 the manually
collected legitimate websites from other Internet resources. The detail about the data
sets used for each experiment is presented in the following corresponding subsections.
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Figure 3.10 True Positive Rate using N RT T for various error tolerance values.
3.5.2

Evaluation of Features and Feature Sets

In this subsection, we evaluate the trade-off between True Positive Rate (T P R) and
False Positive Rate (F P R) among different selected features and different feature
sets. T P R measures the proportion of positives that are correctly identified (i.e., the
percentage of phishing sites who are correctly identified):
TPR =

N umber of correctly identif ied sites
T otal number of phishing sites

F P R measures the proportion of positives that are wrongly identified (i.e., the
percentage of legitimate sites who are wrongly identified as phishing sites):
FPR =

N umber of wrongly identif ied sites
T otal number of legitimate sites
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Figure 3.11 Alleviation of the N RT T instabilities.
Figure 3.16 shows F P R and T P R for all the binary features, including: IPurl ,P and
Rdomain . We can conclude that IPurl and Rdomain introduce 0 F P R while they can only
help to classify < 20% phishing websites which are poorly designed. For P , as more
and more phishing websites deploy the usage of HTTPS protocol, its contribution is
getting lower and lower. However, it still helps in current state. Figure 3.12 shows the
ROC (Receiver operating characteristic) curve of F P R vs. T P R for different URL
based features includes Lurl , Ndots , Nre and the URL set (i.e., combining of all the 3
features plus the binary features P and IPurl ). It shows that the URL set alone cloud
achieve about 90% T P R with 2% F P R. Figure 3.13 shows the ROC curve of F P R
vs. T P R for different feature sets, including: WHOIS set, URL set, web of trust score
and the combination of all the 3 sets. The WHOIS set contains 2 features, namely,
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Figure 3.12 ROC curves of F P R-T P R for different URL based features and URL
set.
the age of the domain and the existence of the registering information in WHOIS
database. The web of trust score is provided by SEO (search engine optimization)
that collects all website ranking information based on Google, Bing, Yahoo etc. The
resutls shows the combination of all the selected feature sets can achieve about 93%
T P R with 0.5% F P R. Figure 3.14 shows the ROC curve of F P R vs. T P R for all the
three selected feature set, N RT T and all the feature set (i.e., the proposed scheme).
It clearly shows that with the combination of all the features, the proposed scheme
can achieve 99% T P R and 0.2% F P R.
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Figure 3.13 ROC curves of F P R-T P R for different feature sets.
3.5.3

Evaluation of N RT T

This evaluation aims to prove that N RT T can achieve high detection accuracy in
classifying verified on-line phishing websites. In the first test, we collect the N RT T
data (i.e., measured from a fixed server to all the destinations) of 928 verified on line
phishing websites that are targeting five popular web service brands, namely, Apple,
Ebay, Facebook, Google and AOL. Figure 3.9 shows the corresponding phishing
websites N RT T distributions for each web service brand. The red dots denote
the phishing website’s N RT T s while the blue dots are the N RT T of the legitimate
websites. We can see that the legitimate websites tend to have smaller N RT T values
while the phishing websites have various N RT T values ranged from a few million
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Figure 3.14 ROC curves of F P R-T P R for selected features set, N RT T and the all
feature set.
seconds to hundreds of million seconds. It clearly shows that N RT T is able to
distinguish between the phishing websites and legitimate website.
Using the same data set, the second test quantitatively shows the detection
accuracy in terms of true positive rate (T P R, i.e., the number of correctly detected
phishing sites divided by the number of all phishing sites) for different values of error
tolerance. As depicted in Figure 3.10, the usage of N RT T for phishing detection can
achieve very high true positive rate (i.e., greater than 93% for a 10 ms error tolerance)
despite of the detection time periods (The blue curve is measured during night time
00:00 AM and the red curve repeat the same detection process during day time 12:00
PM).
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Figure 3.15 True Positive Rate for the website identification algorithm: (1) Text
extraction only; (2) Text extraction plus Image Processing.
To alleviate the impact of the network instabilities, we apply the algorithms
similar to [61] in processing the raw data of the N RT T . These algorithms includes:
(1) outliers filtering; and (2) shared increments removal. Figure 3.11 shows 135 real
time measured profiles for each of the two profiles of one legitimate website for 60
hours from 9:00 AM Friday to 9:00 PM Sunday. The blue dots indicates the real
time profiles without algorithm (1) and (2) while the red small circles are the real
time profiles after applying the algorithms. It clearly shows the proposed algorithms
successfully alleviate the impact of the network instabilities, thus, it helps to reduce
the false positive rate of the system.
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3.5.4

Evaluation of the Target Identification Algorithm

In this test, we use the date set with 851 verified on-line phishing websites (from
PhishTank) and 498 legitimate websites (from Alexa) to evaluate the true positive
rate (i.e., the number of correctly identified sites divided by the number of all sites)
and the false positive rate (i.e., the number of wrongly identified sites divided by the
number of all identified websites) of the proposed target identification algorithm.
As depicted in Figure 3.15, with the help of image processing (i.e., extracting
text from website images), as detailed in Section 3.4.2), the proposed target
identification algorithm can achieve 95% T P R while having a false positive rate less
than 5%. We note that, vast majority of the false positives occurred in phishing

94

Table 3.6 Comparative Evaluation among Different Schemes
Scheme

Year

Data

TPR

FPR

Set
Guang Xiang et al.

2011

940

93%

0.4%

Colin Whittaker et al.

2010

16,967

90%

0.1%

Kurt Thomas et al.

2011

500,000

87%

0.3%

Gowtham Ramesh et al.

2014

3374

99%

0.3%

Teh-Chung Chen et al.

2014

1945

99%

0.7%

Samuel Marchal et al.

2016

1553

99%

0.1%

Proposed scheme

2016

2000

99%

0.2%

websites (the false positive rate for legitimate website is less than 1%), and hence, it
will not affect the T P R of the proposed phishing detection system.

3.5.5

Comparison between the Proposed Framework with State-of-theart Schemes

Table 3.6 compares the evaluation results of the proposed framework to the most
cited state-of-the-art schemes [34] [90] [136] [133] [124] [106]. We note that the a
low false positive rate is of great importance for a phishing detection scheme because
classifying a legitimate website as a phishing would results in serious consequences
[24]. On the other hand, the true positive rate is less important than the false positive
rate. In addition, the T P R highly depends on the phishing test set used and we cannot
conclude scheme A is better than scheme B only if the T P R of A is 1% higher than
the T P R of B. From Table 3.6, we can see that the proposed scheme has comparative
performance comparing to the state-of-the-art schemes.
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3.6

Conclusion

In this work, we propose a new phishing detection framework by integrating a set
of selected phishing detection features. The comparative evaluation of the proposed
scheme shows that it has comparable performance results compared to the state-ofthe-art schemes. In addition, we introduce a new robust phishing phishing detection
feature based on Network Round Trip Time, N RT T . The evaluation results show
that N RT T can achieve high detection accuracy (> 93%) even if using it alone.
To enforce the proposed scheme, we design a novel algorithm to identify the target
website from suspicious URL. The experimental results show that the identification
accuracy can reach 95%.
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CHAPTER 4
ROBUST INSIDER ATTACKS COUNTERMEASURE FOR HADOOP:
DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION

4.1

Introduction

APACHE Hadoop provides an open source framework for the storage and parallel
processing of large-scale data sets on clusters of commodity computers. As the amount
of data maintained by industrial corporations grows over time, big data processing
becomes more important to enterprise data centers. However, the threat of data leaks
also continues to grow due to the increasing number of entities involved in running
and maintaining cloud infrastructure and operations [140]. The recent boost of big
data start-ups such as MongoDB, DataStax, MapR Technologies and Skytree leads to
an increased number of points of access in the cloud, that is, larger attack surface for
intruders. This can be clearly inferred from a recent report of the Health Information
Trust Alliance (HITRUST), which reveals that the total cost of health-care data
breach incidents has grown to $4.1 billion over the recent years [56].
Authentication is the process of gaining assurance that an entity is performing
robustly and precisely as intended [132] [33]. In addition, data confidentiality in
the cloud is tightly correlated to the user authentication [140]. Therefore, a secure
and robust authentication mechanism of both users and services is imperative for
secure and private cloud computing and storage operations [86].

However, the

continuous growth and the concentration of data in clouds, combined with the
increasing adoption of security solutions such as authentication, access control,
and encryption drives intruders to be more persistent and creative in developing
sophisticated attack strategies [122]. One way to protect clouds and to successfully
combat such sophisticated attacks is to push the bar higher through the combination
of hardware and software security solutions.
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Pushing the security down to the

hardware level in conjunction with software techniques provides better protection
over software-only solutions [104], which is especially feasible and suitable for entity
authentication and platform attestation in the cloud.
Currently, Hadoop leverages Kerberos [114] [21] as the primary authentication
method and uses DIGEST-MD5 security tokens [80] to supplement the primary
Kerberos authentication process, as detailed in Section 4.2. However, in addition
to its limitations and security weaknesses, the use of Kerberos for authentication in
Hadoop-based environments raises many security concerns. The most vital weakness
of Kerberos lies in its dependency on passwords. The session key for data encryption
during the initial communication phase with the Key Distribution Center (KDC) is
derived from the user’s password. Disclosure of KDC passwords allows attackers to
capture users’ credentials, which turns all Hadoop’s security to be useless. The large
number of password disclosure incidents through cracking, social engineering, or even
database leakage, clearly indicates that this threat is real and pervasive. For example,
in 2011, RSA was a target of a spear Phishing attack [118]. A backdoor was installed
due to a mistake by an employee who retrieved the Phishing email from her junk
mail box and opened it. The malware successfully harvested credentials as confirmed
by RSA FraudAction Research Labs. It threatened the security of many important
defense contractors like Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and L-3.
Another important issue of Kerberos lies in its dependency on the KDC which
constitutes a single point of failure and even a single point of attack for persistent and
dedicated attackers. Although Hadoop’s security design introduces delegation tokens
to overcome this bottleneck, they lead to a more complex authentication mechanism
due to the extra tokens and data flows that are required to enable access to Hadoop
services. Many types of token have been introduced, including delegation tokens,
block tokens, and job tokens for different subsequent authentications. This, relatively,
large number of tokens, not only complicates the configuration and the management
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of the tokens, but also expands the attack surface [27]. Kerberos keys are stored
in an on-line third-party database. If anyone other than the proper user has access
to the KDC, through, for example, a malware installation by an insider, the entire
Kerberos authentication infrastructure will be compromised and the attacker will
be able to impersonate any user [54]. This highlights the fact that insiders could
create havoc in Kerberos infrastructure itself, and consequently affect the security
posture of the supported Hadoop. It is clear that Kerberos is not well-equipped
against insiders or outsiders who could change the execution environment that the
user trusts. For example, attackers may install key loggers or other malware-tools to
steal users’ credentials and data.
In this work, we design and implement a TPM-based authentication protocol
for Hadoop that provides strong mutual authentication services among internal
Hadoop entities, in addition to mutually authenticating external clients.

Each

entity in Hadoop is equipped with a TPM (or vTPM in the case of multi-home
virtualized environments) that locks-in the root keys for authenticating the entity
to the outside world. In addition to locally hiding the authentication keys and
the authentication operations, the TPM captures the current software and hardware
configurations of the machine hosting it in an internal set of Platform Configuration
Registers (PCRs), as detailed in Section 4.2.3. Using the authentication keys and the
PCRs, the TPM-enabled communicating entities are able to establish session keys
that can be sealed (decrypted only inside the TPM) and bound to specific trusted
platform software and hardware configurations. The bind and seal operations protect
against malicious insiders, because they will not be able to change the state of the
machine without affecting the values of the PCRs. Our protocol enables remote
platform attestation services to clients of third-party, possibly not trusted, Hadoop
providers. Moreover, the seal of the session key protects against the ability to disclose
the encrypted data in any platform other than the one that matches the trusted
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configurations specified by the communicating entities. As Figure 4.1 shows, the
protocol consists of three overlapping phases: (1) Secure exchange of the session key
at the beginning of each communication session; (2) Session key management; and
(3) “Fingerprint” attestation mechanism. The details are presented in the subsequent
sections.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:

• Propose a novel TPM-based authentication protocol among Hadoop entities to
reduce the risk of the continuously evolving insider attacks, especially due to
the proliferation of cloud services and big data applications.
• Propose a periodic remote mechanism for attesting the hardware and software
platform configurations. Such attestation mechanism provides hardware level
security that supports other software mechanisms in reducing the risk of
internal, as well as, external threats.
• Implement the whole system on real world Hadoop platforms and conduct
extensive sets of experiments to evaluate the performance overhead and the
security merits of our mechanism. The performance and security evaluation
clearly shows that our framework provides better security guarantees with
acceptable performance overhead compared to the state-of-the-art Kerberosbased implementations.
• Provide a thorough theoretical analysis using the BAN logic to rigorously
prove the correctness and the trustworthiness properties of our authentication
protocol.

4.2

Background

In this section, we introduce necessary information about Hadoop architecture,
state-of-the-art Hadoop security design and the basis of Trusted Platform Module
technology (TPM).

4.2.1

Hadoop Structure

As depicted in Figure 4.2, Hadoop clusters have three major categories of server roles:
(1) Client machines, (2) Master nodes, and (3) Slave nodes. The role of the client
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Figure 4.1 Overlapping phases of the TPM-based authentication protocol.
machine is to load the data into the cluster, to submit MapReduce jobs describing
how data should be processed, and to fetch or view the results of the task when
processing finishes. The Master nodes (i.e., NameNode, Secondary NameNode and
JobTracker) supervise the two major components of Hadoop, namely, the distributed
data storage (HDFS), and the distributed data processing (MapReduce) [30] [29].
The NameNode is responsible for coordinating data storage operations when a client
machine requests to load the data into HDFS, while the JobTracker is in charge of
supervising parallel MapReduce processing. The slave nodes (i.e., DataNodes and
TaskTrackers) are responsible for storing the data and executing the computational
tasks assigned by the Master nodes, respectively.

4.2.2

Hadoop Security Design

Hadoop uses Kerberos for its authentication operations [80]. The complete authentication process is illustrated in Figure 4.3. The client obtains a Delegation Token
(DT) through initial Kerberos authentication (step 1). When the client uses the DT
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Figure 4.2 Hadoop architecture based on server roles.

Figure 4.3 Authentication process in Kerberos-based Hadoop.
to authenticate, she first sends the ID of the DT to the NameNode (step 2). Then, the
NameNode checks if the DT is valid. If the DT is valid, the client and NameNode try
to mutually authenticate using their own Token Authenticators, which are contained
in the delegation tokens, as the secret key using DIGEST-MD5 protocol (steps 3-6)
[130].

4.2.3

Trusted Platform Module (TPM)

TPM is a secure crypto-processor, which is designed to protect hardware platforms by
integrating cryptographic keys into devices [107]. It has been designed with the goal
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to enhance platform security through mechanisms that are beyond the capabilities of
today’s software-based systems [13].
TPM supports three main services: (1) The remote attestation service creates
a nearly un-forgeable hash-key summary of the hardware and software configurations
in a way that allows other parties to verify the integrity of the software and the
hardware. (2) The binding service encrypts data using the TPM endorsement key,
a unique RSA key burned into the chip during its production, or another trusted
key descended from it. (3) The sealing service encrypts data in a similar manner to
binding, but it additionally specifies the state that the TPM must be in for the data
to be unsealed (decrypted) [107].
The platform configuration register (PCR) of the TPM is a 160-bit storage
location that is used to record aggregate software and hardware measurements of the
platform, which include: (1) BIOS, ROM, Memory Block Register [PCR index 0 - 4];
(2) Operating System (OS) loaders [PCR index 5 - 7]; (3) Operating System (OS)
[PCR index 8 - 15]; (4) Debug [PCR index 16]; (5) Localities, Trusted OS [PCR index
17 - 22]; and (6) Applications specific measurements [PCR index 23] [4].
The TPM is capable of creating an unlimited number of Attestation Identity
Keys (AIK). Each AIK is an asymmetric key pair that is used for signing data that
is internally generated by the TPM, such as the storage key. A storage key is derived
from the Storage Root Key (SRK), which is embedded in the TPM chip during the
manufacturing process. Using the generated storage key along with the PCR values,
one could perform sealing to bind the data to a certain platform state (i.e., a specific
platform software and hardware configuration). The encrypted data could only be
unsealed (decrypted) under the same PCR values (i.e., the same platform state).
To date, more than 500 million PCs have been shipped with TPMs, an
embedded crypto capability that supports user, application, and machine authenti-
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cation with a single solution [104]. Additionally, many virtual TPM implementations
exist for virtualized environments [32] [110].

4.2.4

Integrity Measurement Architecture

Co-operating with the hardware TPM, the integrity measurement architecture (IMA)
(proposed by IBM [17]) provides an efficient measurement system for dynamic
executable content. IMA provides real time measurements of the platform (user
applications, OS libraries, etc.) during the post-boot period, while the TPM enables
the pre-boot measurements. In this dissertation, we assume the IMA is pre-configured
and installed on each platform.

4.3

TPM-based Hadoop Authentication Framework

In this section, we first introduce the attack model, then, we present the design of
the proposed TPM-based Hadoop authentication protocol.
The protocol uses the key binding of the TPM to secure the exchange and
management of the session keys between any two Hadoop communicating entities
(NameNode/JobTracker, DataNode/TaskTracker and Client). To achieve this, we
assume that every Hadoop entity has a TPM. Figure 4.4 (a) depicts the high-level
processes of the protocol which are detailed in the following subsections. The protocol
consists of two processes, the certification process and the authentication process.
Note that the public key infrastructure (PKI) is only used to secure the exchange
of the symmetric session keys. The expensive certification and management process
is only used during the certification process, where the cost amortized through the
use of TPM AIK functionality as explained in Section 4.3.2.

4.3.1

Attack Model

In addition to the traditional external threats, we believe that clouds are more
susceptible to internal security threats, especially from other untrusted users [92]
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[123]. Many enterprises are likely to deploy their data and computations across
different cloud providers for many reasons including load balancing, high availability,
fault tolerance, and security, in addition to avoiding single-point of failure and vendor
lock-in [63] [44] [108]. However, such behavior increases the attack surface and the
probability of compromise of Hadoop entities. For example, a DataNode may get
infected with a malware that makes it unsafe to operate on sensitive data. Therefore,
it is imperative for any security solution for Hadoop to enable the detection of any
unauthorized change in the software and hardware configurations of its entities. Our
entity authentication protocol is specifically designed to counter such adversarial
actions, assuming an attack model with the following attacker capabilities and
possible attack scenarios:

• Attacks against TPM: We do not address the attacks against TPM (e.g., side
channel timing attack [117]).Thus, we assume attackers can not compromise the
TPM chip or its functions.
• Attacks against slave nodes or client machines: We assume that attackers
are capable of installing (directly or remotely) malware or making malicious
hardware changes in the compromised slave nodes (e.g., the DataNodes) or
client machines.
• Attacks against master nodes: We assume that attackers are capable
of installing (physically or remotely) malware or making malicious hardware
changes in the master nodes (e.g., the NameNode). However, this capability
could be revoked if the NameNode is deployed in a trustworthy environment
(e.g., a private cloud with strict security policy enforced), as detailed in Section
4.3.4.
• Denial of Service attacks (DoS attacks): We do not address DoS attacks.

4.3.2

TPM-Based Hadoop Certification Process

The certification process (similar to that presented in [7]) is triggered by the client
or the NameNode and is depicted in Figure 4.4 (b). The client in this work refers
to any entity that interacts with the NameNode such as a user submitting a job or
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a DataNode. The TPM of the client/NameNode creates a RSA key using the SRK
as a parent. This key is used as the AIK. The AIK is then certified by a PCA.
This process is a onetime pre-configuration operation that takes place once during
the initialization of the TPM. The client’s/NameNode’s TPM then creates a binding
key that is bound to a certain platform. Then the TPM seals the private part of the
binding key with a certain PCR configuration. Finally, the client/NameNode uses
the AIK to certify the public part of the binding key. Once the AIK is certified by the
PCA, it can be used to sign all types of keys generated by the TPM without referring
back to the PCA, which greatly reduces the communication overhead.

Figure 4.4 (a)The high level processes of our TPM-based Hadoop authentication
protocol (Client to NameNode in this example); (b)TPM-based Hadoop certification
process; and (c)TPM-based Hadoop authentication process.
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4.3.3

The Authentication Process

The authentication process (cf. Figure 4.4 (c)) implements the mutual authentication
between the NameNode and the client. The Client sends a random number K1 along
with the corresponding IDs (e.g., remoteID in Hadoop codes) to the NameNode. This
message is encrypted by the public binding key of the NameNode. The NameNode
sends a random number K2 along with the corresponding ID to the client. This
message is encrypted by the public binding key of the client. Using K1 and K2 ,
both the client and the NameNode generate the session key key session = K1 ⊕ K2 .
Note that only the correct NameNode can obtain K1 by decrypting the message
sent by the client using the NameNode’s SK bind, which is bound to the target
NameNode’s TPM with a certain software and hardware configuration (sealed binding
key). Similarly, only the correct client can obtain K2 by decrypting the message sent
by the NameNode using the client’s SK bind, which is bound to the client’s TPM
with the corresponding software and hardware configurations. This ensures mutual
authentication between the client and the NameNode.
The newly exchanged session key is then locked into a certain PCR value in
an operation known as seal operation using the TPM’s command “Seal”. Seal takes
two inputs, the PCR value and the session key (Seal(P CRindexes, Key session)).
This ensures that key session can only be decrypted using the hardware secured
keys of the TPM in that particular platform state. By sealing the session key to
specific acceptable hardware and software configurations (i.e., specific PCRs value),
we protect against potential tampering with the firmware, hardware, or software on
the target machine (e.g., through malware installations or added hardware/software
key loggers). Moreover, the session key (key session) is made to be valid only for a
predefined period of time, after which the session key expires and the authentication
process has to be restarted to establish a new session key as needed. The validity
period of the session key is an important security parameter in our protocol. Short
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validity periods provide better security in the case of session key disclosure since fewer
communications are exposed by disclosing the key. However, shorter periods incur
extra overhead in establishing more session keys.
Additionally, a nonce is added to every message to prevent replay attacks.
Finally, message authentication codes (MAC) are included with each message to
ensure data integrity. The communication message format is as follows:
(M essage, M AC, N once = N once + +, IDs)key session

.

4.3.4

Periodic Fingerprint Checking (Cross-Platform Authentication)

In a non-virtualized environment, the TPM specification assumes a one-to-one
relationship between the OS and the TPM. On the other hand, virtualized scenarios
assume one-to-one relationship between a virtual platform (virtual machine) and a
virtual TPM [129]. However, Hadoop systems employ a master/slaves architecture.
The NameNode is the master that manages many DataNodes as slaves.

If the

number of DataNodes grows, the number of session establishment processes that the
NameNode is involved in also grows. Each session involves many TPM operations
(e.g., seal and unseal).

For large systems, the TPM may become a bottleneck

due to the limitation of one TPM/vTPM per NameNode according to current
implementations of TPM/vTPM.
To address this practical issue and alleviate the potential performance penalty of
TPM operations, we introduce the concept of periodic platform-Fingerprint checking
mechanism based on the heartbeat protocol in Hadoop (cf. Figure 4.5). The idea
is to offload most of the work from the TPM of the NameNode to the NameNode
itself. However, this requires us to loosen our security guarantees and change the
attack model by assuming that the NameNode is “partially” trusted. We argue
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that this assumption is reasonable for the following reasons: (i) Hadoop deployment
usually involves one or few NameNodes [119], and hence, it is plausible and affordable
to secure them in a trusted environment. For example, an enterprise can secure its
NameNode by deploying it in the enterprise’s local data center or in a high-reputation
cloud platform with strict security standards. While the DataNodes can be deployed
in environments with less strict security requirements. (ii) Our protocol is designed to
limit the potential security damage of untrusted NameNode. A NameNode that gets
compromised (that is, its software and/or hardware configuration is changed illegally)
will only stay unnoticed for a short time, because other parties (such as DataNodes
and clients) are designed to randomly request attestation of the authenticity of the
NameNode. In on-demand attestation, an interacting entity with the NameNode
asks the NameNode to send a TPM-sealed value of its current software and hardware
configurations. If the requesting entity receives the right values for the PCR of the
NameNode within a predefined time, then the NameNode is trusted; otherwise, a
suspicious alert is raised about the trustworthiness of the NameNode.
The platform Fingerprints (i.e., PCR values) of each Hadoop entity that
interacts with the NameNode (e.g., DataNode) are collected a priori and stored in
the NameNode. This can be achieved during the registration process of the entity
with the NameNode. The heartbeat protocol in Hadoop periodically sends alive
information from one entity to another (e.g., from DataNode to NameNode). We
leverage this native Hadoop feature by configuring each Hadoop entity to periodically
(or on-demand) send the new PCR values (modified by PCR extension operations)
to the NameNode for consistency checking with the stored PCR values. The TPM in
the interacting entity signs its current PCR values using its AIK key and sends the
message to the NameNode. When the NameNode receives the signed PCR values, it
verifies the signature, and if valid, it compares the received values with the trusted
pre-stored values. If a match is found, the authentication succeeds and the session
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continues. Otherwise, the authentication fails and penalty may apply (e.g., clear
up the session key, shut down the corresponding DataNode, etc.). By doing so, the
number of NameNode TPM operations decreases significantly as we replace the TPM
seal and unseal operations with the Fingerprint verification that is performed outside
the TPM (cf. Figure4.5).
However, there is a tradeoff between the security guarantees and the interval of
the Fingerprint verification process, which reflects the extra overhead of the system.
In other words, the interval value depends on the user’s security requirements and is
application dependent.
So far we have assumed that the NameNode is partially trusted and argue
in favor of that. Nevertheless, in systems that require higher security guarantees
and that can afford redundancy, we can eliminate the assumption of partial trusted
NameNode. Untrusted NameNode can be neutralized by borrowing concepts from
the fault tolerance domain. Multiple redundant NameNodes can be deployed and
the NameNode attestation can be achieved through majority voting among the
responses of the different NameNodes [111, 66, 76]. In fact, multiple NameNodes
have been used in Hadoop implementations to scale up services such as directory,
file and block management [119]. We can leverage such deployment (or deploy new
NameNodes if necessary) to implement majority voting on the process of periodic
platform-Fingerprint checking mechanism. Correct NameNode operations can be
achieved as long as the total number of NameNodes is more than 2n, where n is the
number of compromised NameNodes (assuming no faulty nodes). For example, given
5 NameNodes that are independently running on different clouds, the attestation
decision can be made based on the majority voting among them. Under this scenario,
even if two of the NameNodes are compromised, the attestation decision will still be
the correct one.
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4.3.5

Security Features

The security features of our design include: (1) Session key binding. The session
key is generated by XORing a local and an external random numbers (K1 and K2 ).
This ensures that only the party that has the appropriate private portion of the
binding key will be able to decrypt the message and get the external random number.
Furthermore, the decryption keys exist only inside the TPM chip and are sealed to
specific hardware and software configurations. This would protect against potential
malicious insiders as they will not be able to know anything about the session key.
(2) Session key sealing. The session key is sealed with TPM functions. The sealed
session key can be decrypted only under the same platform conditions (as specified
by the PCR values) using the associated sealing key that resides inside the TPM.
(3) Periodic Fingerprint attestation mechanism. This guards against malicious users
who attempt to change the execution environment in a DataNode (by, for example,
installing malware/spyware) in a bid to compromise data confidentiality.

4.4

Formal Security Analysis

We use Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic ([7]) to formally prove the following
two properties of the proposed authentication protocol:

• Correctness: Implies that the protocol performs as intended, that is, two
legitimate parties should always correctly authenticate.
• Trustworthiness: Implies that the protocol is secure under the attack model
defined earlier, that is, only legitimate parties can successfully authenticate.
The proof sketch is shown as follows:

1. Present the notations and postulates/rules of BAN logical.
2. Generate a simplified version of the original protocol.
3. Idealize the simplified protocol.
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Figure 4.5 Illustration of the random attestation and the periodic Fingerprint
verification.
4. Symbolize the assumptions.
5. Formalize the goals.
6. Present the formal prove of the goals.
Recall that the proposed protocol (cf. Figure 4) consists of two main phases: (1)
the certification phase and (2) authentication phases. The simplified objective of the
protocol is to correctly and securely exchange the necessary keys among legitimate
entities in the presence of the defined attackers. Therefore, we first prove that the
public keys distributed by the PCA correspond to the claimed owners, that is, the
mutual authentication parties believe in the public keys of each other, and that the
random numbers (K1 and K2 ) are securely exchanged. Second, we need to prove that
only legitimate entities can compute the session keys, that is, an entity can get the
session key if and only if it maintains the same hardware and software state bound
to that key.
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Figure 4.6 Flow of seal and unseal operations within the various TPM-based Hadoop
implementation layers.
4.4.1

Notations and Postulates/Rules of BAN Logical

Following is a list of the BAN logical notations that we use in our proof steps:

Basic notations:
• C, N, P denote the client, the NameNode and the PCA.
• K1 and K2 are random numbers.
• Kcn is the computed symmetric session key, which is only known by C and N ,
where, Kcn = K1 ⊕ K2 .
• Kc , Kn , Kp are the public keys of C, N , and P .
• Kc−1 , Kn−1 , Kp−1 are the private keys of C, N , and P .
• X or Y : represents a formula (e.g., a message sent).
In addition to the traditional basic notations, we introduce two new basic
notations that represent the hardware and software configurations (recorded in the
PCR values of the TPM):
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Figure 4.7 Illustration of the detailed process of periodic Fingerprint checking
mechanism.
• U and U 0 represent the TPM combined hardware and software initial state and
the state when authenticating, respectively.

Logical notations:
• C |≡ X : C believes/would be entitled to believe X;
• C C X : C sees X. Someone has sent a message containing X to C, who can
read and repeat X;
• C |∼ X : C said X. The principal C at some time sent a message including the
statement X;
• C |=⇒ X : C controls X. The principal C is an authority on X and should be
trusted on this matter;
• C

X

N : X is only known by C and N ;

K

cn
• C ↔
N : Kcn is the key shared by C and N ;

• #(X) : X is fresh. X has not been sent in a message at any time before the
current run of the protocol;
• {X}Kcn : X is encrypted by Kcn ;
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K

• 7→c C : Kc is a public key of C;
•

X
Y

: if X is true, then Y is true.

Ban logical postulates: BAN logic consists of many logical rules. These preagreed rules are used as theorems in the deduction. For the purpose of the current
proof, we use 4 of the existing rules, in addition to a new TPM unsealing rule. Note
that every C in the rules could be replaced by N .

– The Message meaning rule for the interpretation of messages. Here, we only
use the rule for public keys.
K

C |≡7→ P, P C {X}K −1
C |≡ P |∼ X
That is, if C believes that K is P ’s public key, and C receives a message encoded
with P ’s secret key, then C believes P once said X.
– The nonce-verification rule expresses the check that a message is recent, and
hence, that the sender still believes in it:
C |≡ #(X), C |≡ P |∼ X
C |≡ P |≡ X
That is, if C believes that X could have been uttered only recently and that P
once said X, then C believes that P believes X.
– The jurisdiction rule states that if C believes that P has jurisdiction over X,
then C trusts P on the truth of X:
C |≡ P |=⇒ X, C |≡ P |≡ X
P |≡ X
– If a principal sees a formula, then he also sees its components, provided that he
knows the necessary keys:
K −1

C |≡ 7→ N , C C {X}K
P CX
– If a principle’s hardware and software state equals to the initial state, then he
is able to unseal the content he sealed before.
C(U 0 ) == C(U ), C C {X}seal
CCX
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4.4.2

The Simplified Version of the Original Protocol

The original authentication protocol (ref. fig 5) can be simplified as follows:
Step 1: C and N get each other’s public key from P:
P → C : {Kn , N }Kp−1 ;

P → N : {Kc , C}Kp−1

Step 2: C and N exchange two random numbers K1 and K2 to generate the session
key.
C → N : {K1 , C}Kn ;

N → C : {K2 , N }Kc

Step 3: C and N unseal Kc−1 and Kn−1 to extract K1 and K2 if the software and
hardware configuration do not change, then the shared session key Kc n = K1 ⊕ K2
can be generated and used for later communication.
C gets K2 ;

4.4.3

N gets K1

The Idealized Protocol

Now we idealize the original protocol to the standard form of BAN logic:
K

Step 1: P → C : {7→n N }Kp−1 ;
K

Step 2: P → N : {7→c C}Kp−1 ;
Step 3: C → N : {K1 }Kn ;
Step 4: N → C : {K2 }Kc ;
Step 5: C C K2 , N C K1 .

4.4.4

Symbolizing the Assumptions

We formalize the assumptions of the proposed protocol as follows:
K

Kp

K

Kp

C |≡7→ C, N |≡7→ N , C |≡7→ P , N |≡7→ P
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K

K

K

P |≡7→c C, P |≡7→n N , P |≡7→ P
K

K

C |≡ (P |=⇒7→n N ), N |≡ (P |=⇒7→c C)

C |≡ #(K1 ), N |≡ #(K2 )

C |≡ C

K1

N , C |≡ C

K2

N

K

K

C |≡ #(7→n N ), N |≡ #(7→n N )

C and N know the public key of P, as well as their own keys. In addition, P
knows his own keys, and the public keys of C and N . C and N trust P to correctly
sign certificates giving the public keys of them. Also, C and N believe the random
numbers that they generate are fresh, secure. Last but not least, C and N assume
that the message containing the public key of each other is fresh.

4.4.5

Formalization of the Security Goals

The security goals of the proposed protocol can be formalized as:
Goal 1: C and N trust each other’s public keys.

K

K

C |≡7→n N , N |≡7→c C

Only if C and N believe in the public keys of each other, then the two random
numbers K1 and K2 can be securely exchanged.
Goal 2: C and N both get the session key if they maintain the same hardware and
software state.
C(U 0 ) == C(U ) and N (U 0 ) == N (U )
C

Kcn
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N

4.4.6

Formal Proof
Kp

Proof of Goal 1: ∵ the assumption: C |≡7→ P , and the protocol step 1: C C
K

{7→n N }Kp−1 , according to rule (1):
K

∴ C |≡ P |∼7→n N

(1)

K

∵ the assumption: C |≡ #(7→n N ), and equation (1), according to rule (2):
K

∴ C |≡ P |≡7→n N

(2)

K

∵ the assumption: C |≡ (P |=⇒7→n N ), and equation (2), according to rule (3):
∴

K

C |≡7→n N

K

Similarly, we can prove that: N |≡7→c C Therefore, Goal 1 is verified.
Proof of Goal 2: ∵ C sealed its private key Kc−1 himself (i.e., C C {Kc−1 }seal ),
according to rule (5):
C(U 0 ) == C(U )
C C Kc−1

∴

(3)

K

∵ The assumption: C |≡7→ C, the protocol step 4: C C {K2 }Kc and
equation(3), according to rule (5):
C(U 0 ) == C(U )
C C K2

∴

(4)

∵ C generates K1 and equation (4).
∴

C(U 0 ) == C(U )
C C (Kcn = K1 ⊕ K2 )

(5)

Similarly, we can prove that:
N (U 0 ) == N (U )
N C (Kcn = K1 ⊕ K2 )
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(6)

Consequently, based on equation (5) and equation (6), we can conclude that:
C(U 0 ) == C(U ) and N (U 0 ) == N (U )
C

Kcn

N

Therefore, Goal 2 is verified.

4.5
4.5.1

Implementation

Implementation of the Authentication Protocol

To efficiently manage the complex communication flows, Hadoop utilizes RPCDynamic Proxy that creates a simple interface between one client and one server [6].
We divide the implementation of our authentication protocol into three sub-tasks.
Task 1: Includes the exchange of two random numbers K1 and K2 between the
client and the server. In general, multiple “calls” (i.e., different HDFS/MapReduce
commands or operations) may occur within one RPC connection, and we use the
first call in each RPC connection to exchange K1 and K2 . For sending K1 from
the client to the server, we create a new variable Call.connection.K1 in the RPC
connection header field, and then use W riteRP CHeader() function in Client.Java
to forward it to the server.

The server then reads K1 in ReadAndP rocess()

function. For sending K2 from the server to client, we also create a new variable
Call.connection.K2 and conditionally (i.e., if K2 has never been sent) forward it to
the client via SetupResponse() function in Server.java. The client then decodes K2
in ReceiveResponse() function.
Note that both K1 and K2 are encrypted using the corresponding receiver’s
public binding key and decrypted via their sealed private binding key which is bound
to a certain platform configuration.
Task 2: Includes the dynamic protection of the Session Key = K1 ⊕ K2
using TPM seal and unseal operations. After securely exchanging the two random
numbers K1 and K2 , each of the client and the server generates its own copy of
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the Session Key. Right after the generation of the Session Key, a java runtime
process is invoked to execute a shell script (i.e., seal.sh) that immediately seals the
Session Key using jTPM commands via jTSS java interface. Whenever there is a
need to use the Session Key, the client/server invokes another java runtime process
to conduct a shell script (i.e., unseal.sh) to unseal the Session Key for encryption
or decryption of the data. Figure 4.6 illustrates the flow of seal and unseal operations
within the various TPM-based Hadoop implementation layers.
Task 3:

Includes the management and synchronization of the security

credentials (e.g., Session Key , Sealed Session Key and U nsealed Session Key).
In order to efficiently and securely manage the communication credentials, we build a
management and synchronization mechanism for the TPM-based Hadoop. Firstly, we
distinguish the Session Key by the users (e.g., hdfs, mapred) in the same platform.
Since Hadoop utilizes RPC dynamic proxy to simplify the communication, the RPC
connections of the same user could share the same Session Key. This mechanism
greatly reduces the number of seal/unseal operations while maintaining the same
security level. Secondly, since many RPC connections share the same Session Key,
synchronization issues arise (i.e., simultaneous accesses to the same Session Key).
To handle such issues, we create a file called session key list that records the IDs
of all the Session Keys that currently exist. The client/server checks the list before
creating or using the Session Key, and locks the corresponding Session Key while
using it. Thirdly, we define different access control policy and lifetime for different
security credentials. The Session Key has the shortest lifetime (i.e., deleted right
after sealing it) and could only be accessed by the user who created it and the TPM
owner who seals it. The Sealed Session Key holds the longest lifetime (its lifetime
could be adjusted according to the user’s security requirements) and could only be
accessed by the owner of the TPM (i.e., the one who knows the password of the
TPM). The U nsealed Session Key keeps the medium lifetime (depends on the user’s
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Table 4.1 Access Control Policy and Lifetime for Different Security Credentials
Session Sealed UnsealedTPM

Session

Key

Session Session Sealing

Key

Key

List

Key

Key

Shortest Longest Medium Permanent Permanent
Lifetime

Access

All

TPM

User

Control

Users

Owner

TPM

All

Owner

Users

security requirements) and could only be accessed by the user of the corresponding
Session Key. Furthermore, the sealing key (i.e., used for seal/unseal operations)
is well protected by the TPM and can only be accessed by the owner of TPM.
In addition, the session key list only contains the IDs of the Session Keys, thus
knowing the contents of the session key list will not help the attacker to obtain the
Session Key. Table 4.1 shows the access control and lifetime for different security
credentials.

4.5.2

Heartbeat Protocol Implementation

As mentioned in Section 4.3.4, in order to offload the work of the TPM on the
NameNode, we introduce the periodic Fingerprint checking mechanism based on the
heartbeat protocol in Hadoop.
We introduce a new variable P CR signed (the attestation PCR value signed
by the AIK) in the DataN odeCommand array of the DataNode.java and the
NameNode.java. The DataNode will periodically exchange the DataN odeCommand
array with the NameNode via heartbeat protocol. After receiving the attestation
data, the F SN amesystem.java running on the NameNode verifies the signature and
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the PCR values’ using the Fingerprint pool (which contains all the clients’ PCR
values). Finally, a response is generated. For example, if the attestation failed, a
penalty may be applied (e.g., shut down the corresponding DataNode).
The PCR values are periodically updated through ReadP CR() function in
DataN ode.java via a runtime process (i.e., ExtendP CR.sh). The shell script extends
the PCR value using previous PCR value and the new measurements produced by
measurements.sml, as shown in Figure 4.7.

4.6
4.6.1

Performance Evaluation

Test-bed Design and Configuration

To evaluate the security guarantees and the runtime overhead of our authentication protocol, we compare three different Hadoop implementations, namely,
baseline Hadoop (no security), Kerberos-based Hadoop and TPM-based Hadoop (our
protocol). For Kerberos, we use krb5.x86 64 [15]. For TPM, we use Software-based
TPM Emulator because we target the public cloud which relies on virtualized
environment. Additionally, according to IBM’s introduction of software TPM, an
application that can be developed using the software TPM will run using a hardware
TPM without changes[88]. On the other hand, using hardware-based TPMs is easier
and provides better performance, therefore, the performance results obtained here
will be better if hardware-based TPMs were used. To incorporate TPM with Hadoop
project, we modify the source code of Hadoop using ant within eclipse [82] and
use IAIK jTSS (TCG Software Stack for the Java (tm) Platform [81]) and IAIK
jTpmTools (jTT) as the communication interface between Hadoop and TPM. The
detailed test-bed configuration is listed below:

Hadoop Deployment: We configure Hadoop in a test-bed environment that
involves Ubuntu 10.04 LTE operating system, 2GB memory, 60 GB hard disk, Java
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version = Oracle Java-1.7.0 67. There are two DataNodes, two TaskTrackers, one
NameNode and one JobTracker in the Hadoop system.

Hadoop Deployment with Kerberos: For Hadoop security design with Kerberos,
we choose krb5-server.x86 64, krb5-workstation.x86 64, and krb5-devel.x86 64.

Hadoop Deployment with TPM: Hadoop deployment here involves two parts:
(1) virtual TPM configuration and jTSS communication interface configuration;
(2)Hadoop source code modification environment setup. We use software-based ETH
Zurich virtual TPM [109]. The virtual TPM provides all the functionalities of the
hardware TPM. However, the virtual TPM is slower than the hardware TPM and,
hence, the overhead results presented for our protocol are upper bounds. The runtime
overhead of our protocol is expected to be lower when hardware TPM is used.

4.6.2

Runtime Overhead Analysis

It is important to emphasize that developing a new secure authentication protocol,
even though is important, is not enough unless it is feasible and practical. Therefore,
we have to keep the performance penalty and cost of the added security features within
acceptable bounds. In this section, we thoroughly analyze the runtime overhead of
our protocol and compare it with the baseline and the Kerberos-based authentication
protocols.
The cost of cryptographic processes that prevent replay attacks and ensure data
integrity and confidentiality over various communication paths is the same for both
TPM-based protocol and Kerberos-based protocol. On the other hand, each protocol
has a different overhead that does not exist in the other. The TPM-based protocol
incurs a one-time TPM setup overhead that takes place when the TPM in each entity
of Hadoop generates the binding keys, AIK, in addition to obtaining certificates for
these keys. This is a lightweight overhead and does not create big impact on the
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Table 4.2 One Time Overhead of the Proposed System Design
binding

binding

key

key

creation

loading

creation loading certification

˜27.1ms

˜108.4ms ˜24.1ms ˜17.0ms

˜355.8ms

AIK

AIK

binding

Sum

key

˜532.4ms

day-to-day operations of Hadoop as it is a pre-configuration one time overhead. Table
4.2 shows the pre-configuration runtimes for TPM-based Hadoop under our system
configurations. On the other hand, Kerberos-based Hadoop has pre-configuration
overhead to perform KDC registration (e.g., adding principal to the KDC database)
and to acquire and renew TGT (Ticket Granting Ticket).
The runtime overhead of TPM-based Hadoop is mainly due to: (1) the seal
operation to encrypt the Session Key, (2) the unseal operation to retrieve the
Session Key whenever required, and (3) the extend and read PCR operation of
the heartbeat protocol. The number of seal/unseal operations depends on the life
cycle of the U nsealed Session Key (identical to Session Key which is deleted right
after the seal operation). The life cycle of the U nsealed Session Key depends on
the verification interval value of the Fingerprint process.
The overall runtime overhead of TPM-based Hadoop (T ) can modelled as:
T = f unction(N s × T s, N u × T u, N p × T p, T o)
Here, N s is the number of seal operations; T s is the time cost for one seal
operation; N u is the number of unseal operations; T u is the time cost for one unseal
operation; N p is the number of extend and read PCR operations; T p is the time
cost for one extend and read PCR operation; T o is the other extra time costs (e.g.,
verification of PCR signature or exchange of two random numbers, which incurs
negligible time cost compared to the above TPM operations).
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Runtime overhead relative to baseline

Kerberos−based Hadoop
TPM−based Hadoop

50%
40%
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IO read

IO write
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Sort WordCount

MapReduce benchmarks

Figure 4.8 Runtime overhead relative to the baseline Hadoop on 5 different types
of MapReduce applications.
Overall Runtime Overhead for Different MapReduce Applications: In this
experiment, we measure the overall runtime of five different MapReduce applications
to compare the overhead of the two secure Hadoop implementations relative to the
baseline (none secure) implementation of Hadoop. The first two applications are
HDFS write and HDFS read, both of which belong to Hadoop TestDFSIO benchmark.
These two test cases focus on testing Hadoop IO performance. The third test case
is PI example, which calculates the value of π in a distributed way. It has moderate
computation workload and low communication traffic. Another test case is TeraSort
benchmark, a sorting application that collectively tests the HDFS and MapReduce
layers. The last test case is WordCount example, which has moderate communication
traffic and small computation load.
Figure 4.8 presents the results of this experiment. For Kerberos-based Hadoop,
the runtime overhead is about 20% relative to the baseline Hadoop. For the TPM-
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Runtime overhead relative to baseline
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Figure 4.9 Runtime overhead relative to the baseline Hadoop under different
workloads.
based Hadoop, the runtime overhead is about 42% for the HDFS write/read and about
25% for the other 3 applications. The relatively high overhead in HDFS write/read
is due to the heavy load created by these applications on DataNodes.
Runtime Overhead under Different Workloads: In this experiment, we use
the matrix multiplication MapReduce job produced by John Norstad, Northwestern
University [60] to test the impact of varying workloads on the overall runtime overhead
of the three Hadoop implementations under investigation. We vary the matrix size
to generate different workloads. We select three dense matrices with different sizes
(i.e., 250x250, 500x500 and 1000x1000). We run the experiment 10 times for each
matrix size and compute the average runtime over all the runs. Figure 4.9 shows
the results. The figure shows that the TPM-based Hadoop has an extra overhead
of about 6.1% over that of Kerberos-base Hadoop due to the TPM operations. The
runtime overhead decreases as the workload increases for both Kerberos and TPM126

Relative communication overhead
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Figure 4.10 Estimated communication overhead of TPM-based Hadoop relative to
Kerberos-based Hadoop.
based Hadoop. This trend in the overhead is mainly because of the quadruple increase
of the original computational time which makes the approximately linear TPM and
Kerberos operations relatively smaller.
Communication Overhead: To test the communication overhead, we choose the
Sleep example in Hadoop. In the Sleep example, all tasks do nothing but wait for
an assigned amount of time. The purpose of this test scenario is to eliminate the
computational overhead by making it the same among all implementations. According
to previous non-HDFS applications’ experiments, the TPM-based Hadoop has an
average of 6.7% extra overhead than Kerberos-based Hadoop. After eliminating this
difference, the estimated communication overhead (TPM-based Hadoop compared
to the Kerberos-based Hadoop) is summarized in Figure 4.10. The communication
overhead increases as the number of Map tasks increases. This is due to the increase
in the number of TPM operations for the additional RPC sessions that deliver Map
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Figure 4.11 Runtime overhead of TPM-based Hadoop relative to baseline with
variable session key lifetime.
tasks. TPM has an average of 13.4% communication overhead over Kerberos. This
extra communication overhead includes the exchange of the random numbers for
session key establishment and the Fingerprint verification operations.
Variable Session Key Lifetime and Heartbeat Interval Values: As mentioned
in Section 4.3.4, the number of NameNode side TPM operations decreases significantly
as we replace the TPM seal and unseal operations with the Fingerprint verification
that is carried out outside the TPM.
Figure 4.11 presents the runtime overhead for different session key lifetimes
without the Fingerprint verification mechanism. Shorter session key lifetime achieves
better security guarantees at the cost of higher runtime overhead. The overhead is
mainly due to the unseal operations to retrieve the session key. On the other hand, the
Fingerprint verification helps to offload the NameNode’s TPM while maintaining the
same security guarantees by carefully adjusting the attestation interval value which is
128

Relative runtime overhead

Kerberos
Session Key Lifetime = 5 mins
Session Key Lifetime = 3 mins
Session Key Lifetime = 2 mins
Session Key Lifetime = 1 min

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%
3

6

9

15

30

60 No attestation

Attestation interval (Second)
Figure 4.12 Runtime overhead of TPM-based Hadoop relative to the baseline with
variable Fingerprint attestation intervals for various session key lifetimes.
based on the heartbeat rate. Figure 4.12 shows the runtime overhead relative to the
baseline Hadoop for the PI example for various attestation intervals. Intuitively, the
figure shows that the higher the attestation interval, the lower the overhead. Also, the
higher the lifetime of the session key, the lower the overhead. The former trend is due
to the lower number of Fingerprint operations with high attestation intervals; while
the latter trend is due to lower number of seal/unseal operations with high session key
lifetime. Therefore, by turning the session key lifetime and the attestation interval,
we can control the tradeoff between the overhead and security in TPM-based Hadoop.

4.7

Related Work

In early 2013, Project Rhino was launched by Intel as an open source project
with a goal to improve the security capabilities of Hadoop. The group proposes
Task HADOOP-9392 (Token-Based Authentication and Single Sign-On) which
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intends to support tokens for many authentication mechanisms such as Lightweight
Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), Kerberos, X.509 Certificate authentication, SQL
authentication, and Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [10]. The project
mainly focuses on how to extend the current authentication framework to a standard
interface for supporting different types of authentication protocols. Nevertheless, all
these authentication protocols, including Kerberos, are software-based methods that
are vulnerable to privileged user manipulations. An insider or possibly an outsider
could indirectly collect users’ credentials through, for example, the installation
of malware/spyware tools on the machines they have access to in a way that is
transparent to the victims.

Rhino design trades off flexibility with complexity.

Overall, it enhances the flexibility of the authentication mechanisms at the cost of
increasing the complexity of the system.
In [7], the author proposes a TPM-based Kerberos protocol. The proposed
protocol is able to issue tickets bound to the client platform through integrating
PCA functionality into the Kerberos authentication server (AS) and remote attestation functionality into the Ticket-Granting Server (TGS). However, the proposed
mechanism does not provide any attestation for Hadoop’s internal components.
Nothing can prevent malicious Hadoop insiders from tampering with internal Hadoop
components. In this work, we use TPM functionalities to perform authentication
directly inside Hadoop and eliminate the need for any trusted-third-party.
In [35], the authors propose a Trusted MapReduce (TMR) framework that
integrates MapReduce systems with the TCG (i.e., Trusted Computing Group)
trusted computing infrastructure. They present an attestation protocol between
the JobTracker and the TaskTracker to ensure the integrity of each party in the
MapReduce framework. However, they mainly focus on the integrity verification
of the Hadoop MapReduce framework without addressing the authentication issues
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of Hadoop’s HDFS and Clients. Therefore, the authors do not provide a general
authentication framework for the whole Hadoop ecosystem.
In [8], the authors present a design of a trusted cloud computing platform
(TCCP) based on TPM technologies. The proposed design guarantees confidential
execution of guest VMs, and allows users to attest to the IaaS provider to determine if
the service is secure before they launch their VMs. Nevertheless, they do not provide
details about how their design will be implemented and no performance evaluations
are provided. Also, they fail to provide a complete authentication framework among
all the components of Hadoop.

4.8

Conclusion

In this work, we design and implement a TPM-based authentication protocol for
Hadoop that provides strong mutual authentication between any internally interacting
Hadoop entities, in addition to mutually authenticating with external clients. The
bind and seal operations supported by the TPM protect against malicious insiders
since insiders cannot change the machine state without affecting the PCR values.
Furthermore, our protocol alleviates the use of the trusted third party by using the
AIK certification. Moreover, we compare the security features and overhead of our
protocol with the state-of-the-art protocols and show that our protocol provides better
security guarantees with acceptable overhead.
In the future work, we will tighten the security requirements of the NameNode
by removing the assumption of partial trust.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

5.1

Summary

In this dissertation, we present three types of entity authentication mechanisms:
(1) End user authentication: a novel and robust authentication factor based on
network communications latency (Chapter 2); (2) Web server authentication: a
novel and robust phishing detection feature (Chapter 3); and (3) Platform and
service authentication: robust insider attacks countermeasure for Hadoop: design
& implementation (Chapter 4);
In the first work, we propose a new authentication factor based on Network
Round Trip Time (N RT T ) and show how N RT T can be used to uniquely and securely
identify login locations and hence can support location-based web authentication
mechanisms. Two research challenges are identified and resolved. The first research
challenge is that the naive measurement ans usage of N RT T allow the attackers
to easily manipulate or brute force the N RT T profile of the user. We address
this research challenging by introducing a novel network segment: Delay Mask
(DM), to hide the N RT T from the attackers (as well as the legitimate users). In
addition, with multiple DMs deployment (i.e., multiple N RT T profiles), the sample
space of N RT T is enlarged such that manipulation of the N RT T profiles is more
difficulty.

The second research challenge is the network instabilities.

First, we

classify these network instabilities into three different categories: (1) Instantaneous
instabilities are instabilities which lead to transient changes in communications
latency; (2) Long-term instabilities are instabilities that stay long enough to affect
all or most of the of profiling signals; and (3)Routing instabilities are instabilities
that result in permanent changes in network communications latency. We address
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these network instabilities through three novel algorithms, namely, outlier removal
based on Gaussian approximation, shared increment removal algorithm and long
term dynamic temporal profiling. We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate
Security-Usability-Deployability properties of NRTT as an authentication factor and
compare it with state-of-the-art authentication mechanisms.
In the second work, we introduce a new robust phishing phishing detection
feature based on Network Round Trip Time, N RT T . In addition, we design a
new phishing detection framework by integrating a set of selected phishing detection
features together a phishing target identification algorithm. The experimental results
shows the usage of N RT T could increase the detection accuracy while maintaining
a low false positive rate. The comparative evaluation of the proposed scheme shows
that it has comparable performance results compared to the state-of-the-art schemes.
In the third work, we design and implement a TPM-based authentication
protocol for Hadoop that provides strong mutual authentication between any
internally interacting Hadoop entities. The bind and seal operations supported by
the TPM protect against malicious insiders since insiders cannot change the machine
state without affecting the PCR values. Furthermore, our protocol alleviates the use
of the trusted third party by using the AIK certification. Moreover, we compare the
security features and overhead of our protocol with the state-of-the-art protocols and
show that our protocol provides better security guarantees with acceptable overhead.

5.2

Future Direction

In the future, we plan to further investigate the effectiveness and security impacts of
using N RT T and other phishing detection features in a more comprehensive way.
Firstly, we plan to investigate and evaluate more phishing detection features
based on both the detection accuracy and the security impacts (e.g., unforgerybility)
because it is paramount for phishing detection approaches to carefully select the
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features that strike the right balance between detection accuracy and robustness in
the face of potential manipulations.
In addition, we plan to leverage Deep Learning (DL) algorithms to improve the
performance of phishing detection schemes because DL could be a viable alternative
to traditional machine learning algorithms (e.g., SVM, LR), especially when handling
complex and large scale datasets.

134

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[1] 2016 Phishing Trends & Intelligence Report: Hacking the Human. https://info.
phishlabs.com/pti-report-download. [Online; last accessed on 8-April2018].
[2] Anti-phishing extension: Netcraft. http://toolbar.netcraft.com/. [Online; last
accessed on 8-April-2018].
[3] Anti-Phishing Working Group.
accessed on 8-April-2018].

http:/www.antiphishing.org/. [Online; last

[4] ConsumerReports: Smartphone thefts.
www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/
2014/04/smart-phone-thefts-rose-to-3-1-million-last-year/index.
htm. [Online; last accessed on 8-April-2018].
[5] The Cyberwire: Breaking news from RSA. http://thecyberwire.com/issues/
issues2015/April/CyberWire_2015_04_21.html. [Online; last accessed on
8-April-2018].
[6] Dell secure work:
BGP Hijacking for Cryptocurrency Profit.
http:
//www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/
bgp-hijacking-for-cryptocurrency-profit/. [Online; last accessed
on 8-April-2018].
[7] Facebook Connect. https://developers.facebook.com/blog/post/2008/05/09/
announcing-facebook-connect/. [Online; last accessed on 8-April-2018].
[8] Gmail: Detecting suspicious account activity. http://googleonlinesecurity.
blogspot.com/2010/03/detecting-suspicious-account-activity.html.
[Online; last accessed on 8-April-2018].
[9] Google Safe Browsing.
https://developers.google.com/safe-browsing/.
[Online; last accessed on 8-April-2018].
[10] LastPass. https://lastpass.com/. [Online; last accessed on 8-April-2018].
[11] NIST/SEMATECH, e-Handbook of Statistical Methods. http://www.itl.nist.
gov/div898/handbook/.. [Online; last accessed on 8-April-2018].
[12] Phishing
Safety:
Is
HTTPS
Enough?
trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/
phishing-safety-is-https-enough/.
[Online;
last
8-April-2018].

http://blog.
accessed

on

[13] RSA SecurID. http://www.emc.com/security/rsa-securid/index.htm. [Online;
last accessed on 8-April-2018].
135

[14] RSA

SecurID.
http://www.emc.com/collateral/solution-overview/
10695-sidtfa-sb.pdf. [Online; last accessed on 8-April-2018].

[15] Stat 300 materials 7-3a. http://flc.losrios.edu/~eitel/Stat\%20300/S-300\
%20Main\%20Web\%20Page.htm. [Online; last accessed on 8-April-2018].
[16] Symantec:
Internet Security Threat Report.
https://www.symantec.
com/content/en/us/enterprise/other_resources/21347933_GA_
RPT-internet-security-threat-report-volume-20-2015.pdf. [Online;
last accessed on 8-April-2018].
[17] Yahoo

On-Demand
Password.
https://www.yahoo.com/tech/
yahoo-introduces-on-demand-passwords-uses-your-113794671449.
html. [Online; last accessed on 8-April-2018].

[18] Greg Aaron and Rod Rasmussen. Global phishing survey: trends and domain name
use in 2h2009. Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG), Lexington, MA, 2010.
[19] Saeed Abu-Nimeh and Suku Nair. Bypassing security toolbars and phishing
filters via dns poisoning. In IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference
(GLOBECOM), pages 1–6, 2008.
[20] Saeed Abu-Nimeh, Dario Nappa, Xinlei Wang, and Suku Nair. A comparison
of machine learning techniques for phishing detection. In the anti-phishing
working groups 2nd annual eCrime researchers summit. ACM, 2007.
[21] Rakesh Agrawal, Jerry Kiernan, Ramakrishnan Srikant, and Yirong Xu. Order
preserving encryption for numeric data. In the Special Interest Group on
Management of Data (SIGMOD). ACM, 2004.
[22] Fadi A Aloul, Syed Zahidi, and Wassim El-Hajj. Two factor authentication using
mobile phones. In ACS/IEEE International Conference on Computer Systems
and Applications (AICCSA), pages 641–644, 2009.
[23] Anti-Phishing Working Group et al. APWG Phishing trends reports 2010-2016.
https://www.antiphishing.org/resources/apwg-reports/. [Online; last
accessed on 8-April-2018].
[24] Emma Ban.
How important are false positives in measuring the quality
of an antimalware engine?
http://oemhub.bitdefender.com/
importance-of-false-positives-for-antimalware-engine-quality.
[Online; last accessed on 8-April-2018].
[25] Karyn Benson, Rafael Dowsley, and Hovav Shacham. Do you know where your cloud
files are? In the 3rd ACM workshop on Cloud computing security workshop,
pages 73–82, 2011.

136
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